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Executive Summary
Within the context of Human Resources and Social Development Canada’s Knowledge
Plan 2005-2008, this paper presents:
•
•
•
•

an overview of recent changes in the family, their interpretation and implications;
a proposed framework for research on families based on the concepts of “caring,
earning, and learning,” “the life course” and “constrained decision making”;
a summary of findings for each of the broad life course stages; and
implications for policy considerations and for further research.

Family Change and Its Macro-Level Consequences
Like many Western countries, Canada has undergone two demographic transitions: a
long-term change (from about 1870 to 1950), which brought smaller families and a more
rapid change (from about 1960 to the present), known as the second demographic
transition. This transition is characterized by a continuing trend of below replacement
fertility, increasing age at marriage, a high divorce rate, the proliferation of common-law
unions, an increasing proportion of births to non-married women and an increasing
proportion of births to women at age 30 or older.
The second demographic transition has especially been linked to the increased flexibility
in modes of entry and exit from families, increased variability across families, including
the promotion of the values of diversity and tolerance, and promoting marriages and
families as self-made rather than conforming to an external norm. Some implications for
individuals and society arising from this transition include delays in establishing durable
relationships, as people first need to “find themselves,” fewer children and the acceptance
of having no children, as other things take precedence over children as a means of selffulfilment, difficulties in relying on the family as a basis for social cohesion, given the
flexibility, variability and diversity in families, and greater difficulty in formulating
policies that support families as a means of enhancing individual well-being, since
different kinds of families have different interests. Awareness of these changes can point
to certain at-risk groups, including persons in less stable families, those not living in a
family context or lacking the support of kin due to unavailability or distance.
Constrained Decision Making in Caring, Earning and Learning Over the Life
Course
For the framework, we propose the use of the concepts of caring, earning and learning as
these represent the core activities of families, the structure of the life course as it
represents an obvious context within which to view family questions and constrained
decision making as it applies to various family-related behaviour.
The general theoretical orientation based on the tension between caring and earning
provides a useful way to understand much of contemporary family life and family policy.
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As earning and caring are both forms of productive work, they need to fit together as a
means of supporting families. Gender can be highlighted in the analysis, including the
varying time-use patterns of men and women over the life course, and the unbalanced
responsibility for the meshing of production and reproduction. The concepts of earning
and caring are tightly connected as a worker needs care to earn, and needs to earn to be
able to provide care; families having difficulties in one of these domains typically have
difficulties in the other. Earning and caring pay particular attention to economic questions
and maintaining life, but learning is also a central activity of families. It includes learning
the skills needed to earn and to care and passing on the cultural values and ethics through
which resource sharing and caring for each other occur in families and beyond families.
The basic stages of the family life cycle have become inadequate to describe families
transformed by cohabitation, divorce, post-marital cohabitation and remarriage. In place
of a family lifecycle, a life-course perspective provides a more appropriate structure to
study individuals, typically embedded within family or families. A life-course perspective
considers the importance of timing of transitions, particularly the entry into and exits
from family and work roles; trajectories, or series of linked transitions across successive
years, wherein early life transitions impact on subsequent ones; and the influence of
historical, social and cultural contexts on life-course transitions and trajectories. Its
concept of linked lives provides a basis for examining the dependence and transfers
within families defined by common residence, within broader extended family networks
and in communities and society. It provides a structure within which to consider learning,
earning and caring, the nature and relative importance of which vary over the life course.
In terms of policy issues, consideration of caring, earning and learning over the life
course is particularly useful for identification of persons now at risk or likely to be at risk
later in life, determining when interventions would be most required, and providing a
structure for comparing earning and caring across generations, gender, space and culture.
The third component of the proposed framework is an overarching decision-making
theory that considers the constraints at both the micro and macro levels involved in
behaviours related to life-course events, including those associated with education, work
and family. It retains the central economic notion of constrained choice, recognizing that
humans are not able to choose anything they want but invariably must choose within
constraints. Our options are limited, often in ways that go far beyond the limits suggested
by the economic model.
The concepts of caring, earning and learning, the structure of the life course, and the
theory of constrained decision making provide a framework through which research
findings could be organized. It could also be useful in structuring plans for future
research on families.
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Trends in Caring and Earning Over the Life Course
Family transformations have affected everyone, but impacts vary by life-course stage.
Children benefit from many of the behaviours of adults, especially later childbearing,
fewer children and dual incomes, but they sometimes suffer from the greater flexibility of
adults in restructuring their relationships. In cases of lone- and step-parenthood, many of
the difficulties faced by children relate to diminished transfers of financial, human and
social capital. The differential investment in children may lead to greater disparity in the
parenting and life chances of children. On the one hand are children born to parents who
married late, and brought up in intact families by parents with a high education and
income. On the other, are children born to women at a young age, raised with inadequate
resources and with fathers absent.
Youth have been delaying the transition to adulthood, as seen in an older age at leaving
the parental home, a longer period of education, later entry into regular work and later
entry into union and parenthood. Not only have these life-course transitions been delayed,
they are also more fluid (or less precisely defined) and more variable from case to case,
making it less possible to speak of a standard model of movement into adulthood. There
are two contrasting views of marriage: one model based on complementary roles and the
other, a career-entry model based on two earners. In the latter model, the disadvantaged
economic status of young workers and recent entrants to the labour force, is a crucial
matter. The delayed entry into marriage could be attributed to the complexity of
achieving two rewarding jobs and a stable relationship.
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Cohabitations take on a variety of forms ranging from those that are equivalent to
marriage to those that might better be seen as an alternative to living single. Cohabitation
delays marriage, it is twice as likely as first marriage to end in separation and the level of
childbearing is lower than in marriage.
In mid-adulthood, there are trends associated with earning and caring. For instance,
while the trends in labour force participation for women and men are converging,
parenthood still has the opposite average effects: women with children at home are less
likely to work full time and the younger the child the less likely they are to be working
full time; men are more likely to work full time if they have children at home. In contrast
to the view that an efficient household would involve at most one person in the market
and another in home production, many couples seek to optimize on considerations other
than efficiency, like reducing vulnerability to risk or maximizing on mutuality. Several
factors push men toward more domestic work, including the rising women’s share of
family incomes, normative changes in the direction of equality and sharing, and the
family changes of later marriages, more cohabitation and more remarriages prompting
alternate models of the division of work.
Other family trends, more common at mid-adulthood, relate to union dissolution. The
determinants of marriage dissolution include both instrumental and expressive
dimensions, that is, a decrease in the functions fulfilled by families has meant that there
are fewer economic or other practical ties holding families together, and spouses expect
more from families in terms of intimacy and interpersonal affect. The average economic
consequences of union dissolution are declines in adjusted family income for women,
particularly for those with children, and gains for men. Average gains are higher for those
forming new unions after the separation, with men more likely to do so.
As for the elderly, they may be viewed as those in early old age and late old age. The
delays in early life transitions imply that the participation in the labour force of persons in
their 60s and 70s may need to be extended. This may include removing incentives to
early retirement, along with forms of reduced responsibility. Informally, it may involve
more orientation to caring and volunteer work. In the fourth age, disability and chronic
conditions call for less involvement in production, but persons at these ages are not
necessarily dependent. Some remain able to care for others, in their family and beyond.
The dependent elderly are mostly taken care of by their family, despite the presence of
public and institutional care facilities, but the availability and distance of kin are
important considerations.
Policy Issues
Considering the three ways of handling risks — individual self-sufficiency, family
support and a social safety net — a central question is the sharing between families, the
state and the private sector in the care of people who are dependent because of age,
disability or health. The state seeks to encourage family support of dependants and to
encourage self-reliance but, the persons who look after dependants within families will
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have less ability to be self-sufficient in the labour market. The challenge is to assist
individuals and families, but in ways that also maximize self-reliance.
As we opt for a society with fewer inter-spousal dependencies and more equality between
men and women, it is useful to take note of, and possibly aim to change, legal provisions
that remain based on a traditional breadwinner model. Some issues that may be worth
looking at are specific policies related to balancing work and family life, support for lone
parents, intergenerational equity and the role of the private sector. More importantly,
because the continuing trend of below replacement fertility has significant implications
for society, policies that support childbearing deserve serious consideration.
Family Research: Themes, Priorities and Research Styles
Despite the advances made in family research, there is a need to understand the processes
and mechanisms involved in the decisions we make.
•
•
•

What are the goals, emotions, thought processes, expectations, social pressures, etc.
that drive us?
To what extent do we really choose our life paths, and to what extent are we
programmed by family, peers, churches, government, popular culture and the media?
To what extent are our choices severely limited by poverty, dysfunctional families or
the labour market?

Answers to these and other questions require empirical research that will supplement and
complement the sample survey research, but also the development of theories and models
that can explicate underlying processes and mechanisms not easily captured in empirical
data or statistical models. We identify important family research priorities in the last
section of the paper.
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1. Introduction
Our objective is to help evolve a family research framework at Human Resources and
Social Development Canada (HRSDC) that would inform the development of a mediumterm research strategy on families. After setting the context within relevant aspects of
Knowledge Plan 2005-2008: A Discussion Paper, we proceed to discuss:
•
•

•
•

an overview of the recent changes in the family, seen mainly as a second
demographic transition, and their macro-level consequences;
the concepts of “caring, earning and learning,” “the life course” and “constrained
decision making” to provide a conceptual and structural framework that shifts the
focus from the macro-level to families and individuals;
a summary of available research including comments on areas in need of further
research for each of the broad life-course stages; and
general policy considerations and specific family-related policy issues.

We conclude with some practical considerations about family research including a multidisciplinary approach, data, methods and styles of social research.
Knowledge Plan 2005-2008: A Discussion Paper
The Knowledge Plan 2005-2008 seeks to “increase our understanding of the factors,
determinants and evolution of Canadian’s well-being (from perspectives of material,
personal and belonging) and their socio-economic participation (in learning, the labour
market or economy, family life and community life)” (p. 5). One of the seven parts of the
research agenda is entitled “Challenges for Canadian Families” where families are seen
as “an essential building block of Canadian society, contributing to both individual and
social well-being” and serving fundamental social and economic roles (“reproduction;
parenting; nurturing and providing support for family members; caring for children,
seniors and the disabled; earning income and consuming goods; and participation in
communities and society” (p.21)). Family questions are thus related to other parts of this
research agenda, especially the sections on child development, seniors and persons with
disabilities. Since the life course relates considerably to family questions, the section on
well-being and participation over the life course can be related to the learning, caring and
earning activities of families, which have consequences for “social and economic
inclusion.” Social cohesion can be discussed in terms of families as potential links
between individuals and communities, and thus the relevance to the section on “inclusive
communities, the voluntary sector and the social economy” (p. 33).
In the section on key knowledge gaps associated with the research agenda on Canadian
families, the Knowledge Plan uses the following sub-titles (pp. 23-24):
•
•
•

social and economic influences on family formation, family well-being and roles;
income adequacy and low income;
work–life balance, family roles and life transitions;
8

•
•
•

parenting and intergenerational transfers;
caregiving; and
community participation.

While this Knowledge Plan expresses good coverage of available research, we take
another look at the literature on families to suggest a framework for analysis, highlight
research gaps, methodological and data issues, and policy considerations. Further
discussions of these questions are important in view of HRSDC’s mission to promote the
well-being and participation of individuals and families, and in view of the key social and
economic roles that families assume.
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2. Family Change and Its Macro-Level Consequences

Changes in the Family: A Second Demographic Transition
Family change could be thought of in terms of two demographic transitions: a long-term
change (from about 1870 to 1950), which decreased birth rates and a more rapid change
(from about 1960 to the present), which increased flexibility in marital relationships
(Lesthaeghe 1995; Beaujot 2000, pp. 85-96).
The first transition involved a change in the economic costs and benefits of children,
along with a cultural environment that made it more appropriate to control family size. It
also entailed an important change in surviving children, as mortality steadily decreased,
such that a given number of surviving children required ever fewer births. In effect, this
transition changed family dynamics surrounding fertility from an emphasis on child
quantity to a focus on child quality.
The second transition focusses on changes with regard to the entry and exit from
relationships, which show greater flexibility manifest especially through cohabitation and
divorce. Besides this flexibility, the family change has involved greater diversity, and
relationships that are defined to a greater extent by the partners themselves (projet de
couple) rather than corresponding largely to an external norm. Lesthaeghe (1995)
proposed that this second transition consist of three stages. The first stage, from about
1960 to 1970 involved the end of the baby boom, the end of the trend toward younger
ages at marriage, and the beginning of the rise in divorces. The second stage from 1970 to
1985 saw the growth of common-law unions and eventually of children in cohabiting
unions. The third stage since 1985 includes a plateau in divorce, an increase in postmarital cohabitation (and consequently a decline in remarriage), and a plateau in fertility
due in part to higher proportions of births after age 30.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Family Change, Canada, 1941-2002
1941

1951

1961

1971

1976

1981

1986

1991

1996

2002

2.8

3.5

3.8

2.1

1.8

1.7

1.6

1.7

1.6

1.5

Median age at first marriage
Brides
Grooms

23.0
26.3

22.0
24.8

21.1
24.0

21.3
23.5

21.6
23.7

22.5
24.6

23.9
25.8

25.1
27.0

26.3
28.3

27.0
29.0

Divorces per 100,000
married couples

--

180

180

600

990

1,180

1,302

1,235

1,222

1,050

Common-law couples as
percent of all couples

--

--

--

--

0.7

6.4

8.2

11.2

13.7

16.4

--

16.7

18.8

28.6

36.3

36.6

Total fertility rate
(average births per woman)

Births to non-married women
as percent of all births
Births to women aged 30+
as percent of all births
Lone parent families as percent
of all families with children

4.0

3.8

4.5

9.0

35.6

36.2

34.1

21.6

19.6

23.6

29.2

36.0

43.7

47.4

9.8

9.8

11.4

13.2

14.0

16.6

18.8

20.0

22.3

25.0

Notes: 1. For 1941-71 births to non-married women are designated as illegitimate births.
2. Data for 2001 are shown as 2002 for common-law couples and lone parent families.
Source: Beaujot and Kerr (2004, p.212).

Table 1 presents some statistics that capture these trends in the Canadian case. In terms of
the first stage, the average births per woman, as measured by the total fertility rate, had
reached a peak of 3.9 in 1957, declined to 2.2 in 1971, and has been relatively stable at
about 1.7 to 1.5 births per woman over the whole period 1980 to 2002. The median age at
first marriage declined over this century to reach a low of just over 21 years for brides
and 23 years for grooms in the early 1970s, then increased to ages 27 and 29 for women
and men respectively in 2002. The law permitting divorces on grounds other than
adultery dates only from 1968. Per 100,000 married couples, there were under 200
divorces in each year over the period 1951-1966 compared to 990 in 1976 and 1,050 in
2002. There had been a long-term increase in separation and divorce with a substantial
jump starting in the 1960s. While most marriages remain intact until death, there is
greater looseness in the definition of relationships so marriage is no longer forever.
Turning to the second stage, analysis of 1976 Census data shows less than one percent of
couples cohabiting. By 1995, the General Social Survey found that among persons born
between 1951 and 1970, two out of five have lived in a cohabiting union, and over half of
first unions taking place since 1985 have been cohabitations rather than marriages
(Dumas and Bélanger 1997, pp. 135, 139). The 2001 Census determined that 16.4 percent
of couples were cohabiting.
The proportion of births occurring to women who are not married, and who are largely
cohabiting, increased from nine percent in 1971 to 36.6 percent in 2002. Previously,
cohabitation was mostly premarital relationships; currently, many post-marital
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relationships are cohabiting unions. Along with separation and divorce, cohabitation has
become a key indicator of family change.
For the third stage, we find that by 1990, half of divorced persons aged 30 to 39, and
more than a third of those aged 40 to 49, were in cohabiting relationships (Dumas and
Péron 1992, p. 50). In 2001, over half of step-families involved cohabiting partners (Le
Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2004). While fertility has remained relatively stable at
1.7 to 1.5 births per woman over the period 1981-2002, the proportion of births occurring
to women aged 30 and over increased from 19.6 percent in 1976 to 47.4 percent in 2002.
These changes in births, marriage, cohabitation and divorce have brought fewer children,
but also a higher proportion of children not living with both biological parents. In
particular, lone-parent families as a proportion of all families with children increased
from 11.4 percent in 1961 to 25.0 percent in 2001.
These data also confirm the uniqueness of the 1950s as a period between the two
transitions. Various authors have observed that this was a period when life was family
centred. Not only was this the peak of the baby boom, but it was also a period of marriage
rush, as marriage occurred at young ages and high proportions of persons married at least
once in their lives. In North America, this was an era of unusual prosperity and economic
optimism, which allowed the maximum number of individuals to realize traditional
norms about marriage and the family. It was possibly a "golden age of the family," where
many families corresponded to the ideal of domesticity, especially in the suburbs, and
consequently there was less variability (Skolnick 1987, pp. 6-16).
Subsequent research has made it clear that not all was ideal in this golden age. Isolated
housewives in particular experienced a lack of self-worth, referred to by Friedan (1963, p.
15) as the "problem with no name." Since the task of maintaining the home had been
assigned to women, men became less competent at the social skills needed to nourish and
maintain relationships (Goldscheider and Waite 1991, p. 19). The idealism of the time
also introduced blinders regarding some realities of family life, including violence and
abuse. Given a general denial that such things could ever occur in families, there was
little recourse for the victims of violence. There was also a lack of autonomy, especially
for women, to pursue routes other than the accepted path (Veevers 1980). Childless
couples were considered selfish, single persons were seen as deviants, working mothers
were considered to be harming their children, and single women who became pregnant
were required either to marry or to give up the child to preserve the integrity of the family
(Kersten and Kersten 1991; Wilson 1990, p. 99).
The restriction on alternative life styles did imply few single-parent families. In
hindsight, there were pent-up problems that were preparing the way for the second
transition that started in the 1960s.
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Family Variability and Uniformity
A common theme in the literature is the greater variability in family patterns. The varied
forms of entry and exit from relationships, having or not having children, and in the
timing of childbearing, represent many differences across the family life trajectories of
individuals. However, it is useful to recognize some elements of uniformity, sometimes
more uniformity than in the past. At ages 30 to 54 there is a strong commonality of
experience involving living in a relationship, having children and working, and little
change in the propensity to live alone (Beaujot 1995). Households now mostly consist of
either one family with no additional persons, or one person living alone (Péron et al.
1999). Living in non-family households occurs mainly for the elderly who have
previously lived in families, and for the young who are between families. The high
predominance of family living is also visible when considering the extent of cohabitation.
In sum, the main changes have seen more families formed through common-law unions,
lone parenthood and blended families, while the proportion that are two-parent families
based on marriage has declined. Nonetheless, by age 20, 76 percent of children from the
1961-63 birth cohort have known no other than two-parent intact families (Péron et al.
1999). In addition, based on data gathered through the 1990 General Social Survey, 84
percent of married men and women have had no previous union (Péron et al. 1999, pp.
107,161).
Macro-Level Implications of Family Change
At the population level, the second demographic transition is linked with powerful
demographic changes: population aging, increased diversity and changes in family
structures. In particular, this demographic transition brings low fertility and aging, more
diverse families, increased internal migration and a greater contribution of immigration to
population change. These demographic and family changes point to certain groups that
are at risk, including persons in less stable families and persons who are not living in a
family context, many of whom are separated by great physical distance from members of
their kinship network. Greater diversity in family experiences implies variability across
individuals, be they adults or children.
Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002) argued that the second transition has undermined social
cohesion. Given the greater importance accorded to individual autonomy, the second
demographic transition is characterized by a weaker role for families in establishing
social ties, a diversity of family types instead of the one-family model based on intact
marriages and childbearing largely seen as a means of individual fulfillment.
The most significant social trend linked with the lower fertility and delayed reproduction
of the second demographic transition is population aging. When the trend toward low
fertility began, issues of aging and eventual population decline were not seen as
particularly significant, partly because of the long time frame involved. Canada’s belowreplacement fertility levels were first evident in the early 1970s. With relatively few
elderly and a large number of people in their reproductive years, the population was still
growing. Nonetheless, a population with a fertility rate of below two births per woman
13

will eventually have more deaths than births. In Canada’s case, this is likely to occur
sometime shortly after 2025 (Statistics Canada 2001b). While immigration helps to
postpone population decline, and at plausibly high levels, it could avoid it altogether for
a long time to come, immigration has relatively (i.e., compared to fertility) little effect
on age structure and cannot prevent population aging.
The implications of population aging are complex and multi-faceted. Lutz and his
colleagues (2003) identified a number of concerns related to aging and population
decline including challenges to social security and health systems, more difficult
productivity gains, strained relations among generations who are contributors or
receivers of public pension programs and diminished social cohesion if societies have
difficulty incorporating larger numbers of immigrants. There are also issues associated
with caregiving to a large proportion of the population, including the gendered nature of
caring activities, where women typically carry a greater share of the burden.
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3. Constrained Decision Making in Caring, Earning and Learning
Over the Life Course
We propose to join the concepts of caring, earning and learning, the structure of the life
course and an overarching theory of constrained decision making to construct a
framework for research on families. Each component is discussed and then put with the
others in Figure 1 locating the various topics of family research within the framework.
The section concludes with a discussion of policy options in relation to caring, earning
and learning over the life course.
Defining Families
A family could be defined as a group of persons related by descent from a common
ancestor (“blood”), by marriage (or its equivalent) or by some legal or cultural fiction
(anthropologists use the term “fictive kinship”), with the latter including adoption and
god-parenthood.
Given the diversity across families, definitions become difficult. The “economic family”
as defined by Statistics Canada for purposes of data collection, consists of two or more
people related by blood, marriage, cohabitation or adoption, and residing together. While
it is difficult to define families in other ways for purposes of data collection, we need to
recognize that family relations go beyond households. Sometimes persons in family
relationships live apart much of the time. Milan and Peters (2003) used the expression
“living apart together.”
Instead of defining families through what families are, the definition can focus on what
families do (Daly 2005). Smith (1997) referred to families as co-ordinating the uncoordinated. The co-ordination of activities in families includes caring for each other,
earning a living and learning to acquire the necessary human, social and cultural capital.
But, while focussing on activities describes a family, the basic definition of family need
not be entirely discarded; otherwise the term loses much of its specific meaning. A fastfood outlet co-ordinates the activities of the unco-ordinated, but we would not generally
call it a family except by analogy.
Fox and Luxton (1991) defined families as relationships that bring people together daily
to share resources for the sake of caring for children and each other. One respondent in a
survey of “unconventional families” defined families as “taking care of each other and
promoting each other’s well-being” (Fox and Fumia 2001, p. 465).
In some censuses, families or households have been defined as people eating out of the
same pot. This is an interesting definition since eating together is a basic form of sharing
and caring for each other. In addition, the food needs to be obtained and prepared,
important activities that contribute to caring. The skills necessary to earn a living and
maintain a household need to be learned. As circumstances change, learning is a lifelong
activity, including acquiring skills and the cultural capital of values and attitudes. The
15

specific arrangements of caring, earning and learning imply much variety across families,
especially if one includes the culture and traditions developed in families, to the point
that one could consider each family unique. Nonetheless, families can usefully be defined
as small groups of kin devoted to the organization of caring, earning and learning.
Thus, a central activity of families involves sharing and transfers. The human species is
unique in terms of caring that is not limited to immature individuals, but including those
who are not self-sufficient. As with societies and communities, the activities of families
include distribution of benefits within the group (McMullin 2004, p. 49). Many things
result from the basic fact that consumption is needed over the life course, but some
individuals have more productive abilities than others. Educational systems, investments
and banking, as well as pensions, can be related to this basic constraint in the human life
course. Families play a central role in the redistribution from production to consumption.
This includes the sharing aspect of families, but also the importance of families to
learning the skills of production and the norms of redistribution.
Families and Earning, Caring and Learning
We propose a conceptual framework that focusses on key activities of families: activities
that are relevant over the life course. These activities of caring, earning and learning are
of central importance to the well-being of individuals, families and societies.
Defining Earning, Caring and Learning
Earning is used here broadly to include any market or non-market activity through which
income or wealth is obtained. That is, besides market work, earning includes such things
as inheritance, and profits from investments and pensions. Clearly, these are not the only
means through which individuals and families obtain valuable resources. That is, there
are other ways in which families obtain resources and share these to sustain and promote
the well-being of individuals and families. The focus on resources obtained directly or
indirectly through the market highlights the importance of earning in capitalist social
arrangements, and of alternate means of economic support for families that have financial
difficulties, be they due to age, disability or social exclusion.
We see caring as the central way through which families are defined. Families are groups
of people who care for each other. Daly (2005, pp. 8-10) observed that
care is the essence of what it means to be family…we are both recipients
and providers of care when we live in families…the common denominator
in all families is that care is expressed and received…in whatever form
they take, families are society’s anchor for the provision of care.
This includes child care, elder care, housework and, in effect, all unpaid work. However,
while this is the way it should be and usually is, there are many exceptions such as cases
of child, spouse and elder abuse.
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Volunteering and community participation is typically caring work that is unpaid and that
goes beyond the family. In social settings where there is a lack of available kin,
neighbours and friends often play caring roles, ensuring that children make it safely home
from school, providing care in an emergency situation. Caring includes more than care
giving or caring for, it includes caring about someone’s well-being, and resource sharing
within and beyond the household in taking care (Daly 2003). That is, caring includes
“feelings of affection and responsibility combined with actions that provide responsively
for an individual’s needs or well-being” (McMullin 2004, p. 141).
Earning and caring pay particular attention to economic questions and maintaining life,
but learning is also a central activity of families. This is a focus for the young, but it also
occurs over the life course. It includes learning the skills needed to earn and to care, or
acquiring human capital, but it also includes passing on the cultural values and ethics
through which resource sharing and caring for each other occur in families. That is, it
includes the development of human capital for earning and the development of human
capability to care (Daly 2005, p. 11). Another advantage of the concept of learning is that
it places more importance on the activities of children and youth in families, and gives
them agency, or more concretely, important roles and responsibilities. Further, the
concept of lifelong learning can include stages where one person is looking after earning
while the other upgrades skills to become a stronger earner at another stage.
Earning, Caring, and Learning as a Conceptual Framework
A conceptual framework based on caring, earning and learning (or production,
reproduction and passing on the culture, expressed at individual and family levels)
encompasses public and private spheres and does not presume a specific division of
labour between men and women. Families, as emotional and economic units, can be seen
as coming together in instrumental and expressive activities, with caring for each other,
learning and earning a living as their core activities. The general theoretical orientation
based on the tension between caring and earning provides a useful way to understand
much of contemporary family life and family policy. This includes how families interact
with other agents, especially kin networks, community and government. Families receive
support from society in terms of caring, earning and learning, and they also participate in
communal activities that build social capital and maintain society.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the concepts of caring, earning and learning are tightly
connected and their outcomes are manifested in individuals, families and society, forming
a system with feedbacks; that is, when one part is strengthened, all others are
strengthened as well. The worker needs care and regeneration to be able to earn. We need
to earn to have the wherewithal to provide care. Learning is important to be able to earn,
and the income from earning is necessary to learning. These activities are also linked
over generations, through various transfers in care, in income and in learning or human
resources.
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Figure 1: Interrelations of Activities, Individuals, Families and Society
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Families that suffer typically have trouble in one of these domains. And given the tight
mutual links described above, those having difficulties in one domain typically have
difficulties in the others. Thus, measuring the risks associated with caring, earning and
learning is a useful way to understand family problems, to analyze the broader social and
systemic bases for the difficulties, and to look for areas of policy intervention.
As further elaborated in Box 1, the evolution of the human life course - including a long
period of juvenile dependency, menopause that stops reproduction long before death and
a long life expectancy - mold families and societies in ways that support production,
reproduction and distribution (Kaplan et al. 1998; Draper 1998). These features of the
human life course indicate the importance of both reproductive partnerships, and broader
kin or social networks to the maintenance of life and the development of culture.
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Box 1: Evolution of Human Life Course
In his theory of the evolution of the human life course, Kaplan (1997) makes the case that, compared to
other primates and mammals, three distinctive features characterize human life histories: (1) an
exceptionally long life span, (2) an extended period of juvenile dependence, and (3) support of
reproduction by older post reproductive individuals. He proposes that the ecological niche in which the
human species evolved, obtaining nutrient-dense but difficult-to-acquire foods, has meant that
“effective adult foraging requires an extended developmental period during which production at young
ages is sacrificed for increased productivity later in life.” In this model of the major life course
tradeoffs, investments in foraging efficiency have evolved along with mortality reduction and the age
pattern of investments in reproduction. That is, greater efficiency in production is achieved at the
expense of a longer period of childhood and adolescent dependence. Productivity then continues over
an extended life span, beyond the ages at which reproduction takes place. This post-reproductive
productivity permits transfers to the younger generation as they enter adult ages, and thus supports their
reproduction
Calculations of food production and consumption suggest that, if young adults are reproducing, thus
necessitating food transfer to the next generation, this young “nuclear family” is often not nutritionally
self-sufficient. It will depend on transfers from its embeddedness in a larger extended family or social
group. Sometimes this takes the form of offspring living with grandparents for given periods. Thus even
at typical ages for starting reproduction, given the additional transfers of reproduction itself, there is
dependence on older post-reproductive individuals who remain productive.
In effect, our major institutions are built around the fact that consumption occurs throughout life while
production does not. This lack of congruence between production and consumption, and the consequent
periods of dependency over the life course, underlies not only families as a means of transfer and
support, but kin networks, and in modern societies the very banking system, the need for savings,
investments, and insurance, both private and collective. Stated differently, the structural constraints on
the life course include not only consumption and production, and the associated opportunities and
constraints, but also societal structures, policies and regulations (Corijn 2001).
Besides helping to understand the age at life course transitions, this perspective on the evolution of the
human life course helps in interpreting the emphasis on quality of reproduction, which has been
furthered in modern skill-based economies. It also suggests that quality reproduction depends on
transfers from persons in the post-reproductive stage, through either family or social mechanisms. It
could be that our institutions have become too focussed on supporting dependents at later ages,
including personal and collective investments to support a long retirement period. To ensure that
younger persons can become reproductive, we may need to work out better transfers toward the young
at ages beyond the teen years, and a longer period of post-reproductive productivity, instead of early
retirement and a long period of dependency late in life. Aging societies are tempted to pay particular
attention to the aged, which can undermine the very potential for reproduction.
Source: Excerpt from Beaujot (2004).

Life-Course Paradigm
Family Life Cycle
The concept of family life cycle captured the stages of a modern nuclear family from its
formation through its dissolution and, until the 1970s, was used as a structural framework
for analysis of families in various disciplines including demography, sociology and
psychology. The basic stages of family life cycle included family formation typically
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through marriage, its extension with childbearing, contraction when children leave home
and dissolution through death of a spouse.
For the older cohorts, it is possible to view their life course through the lens of a nuclear
family cycle. Many in these older cohorts formed their families before the rapid changes
in the 1960s. Using retrospective data collected through the 2001 General Social Survey
of Family History, for example, Ravanera et al. (2005a) examined the timing of family
life of Canadians born between 1926 and 1945. As can be seen in Figure 2, a man born in
1926-30 typically started work at about 18 years, left his parent’s home at 22, married at
age 26, became a parent at 28 and continued having children until age 36. His first child
left home when he was age 50 and his last child left when he was 59. He retired from
work at almost 66 years old. A man born 15 year later (in 1941-45) started work a year
later at 19 years but experienced the other family life events at younger ages so his nest
had emptied by 55, or four years earlier than that of a man born 15 years earlier.

Figure 2: Median Age at Life Course Events, Males, Canada
2001 General Social Survey
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Source: Ravanera et al. (2005a).

The median age at retirement could not as yet be estimated as members of the 1941-45
cohort were about 56 to 60 years old in 2001. One main factor that changed the lifecourse timing is the decrease in the number of children, which shortened the period
between the start of parenthood and the birth of the last child (or, the completed extension
period, to use a family cycle term).
The concept of family life cycle, however, has become inadequate to describe families
transformed by cohabitation, divorce, post-marital cohabitation and remarriage. No
dominant family form has replaced the nuclear family type; rather, families are formed
and re-formed by conditions confronting individuals and families. This is particularly true
for young cohorts still in the process of going through the early phases of their life
course. Charlotte Hohn (1987) identified as many as 40 types of family life cycles to take
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into account variations as to presence of children, marital dissolution and remarriages.
The concept of family life cycle has itself become inappropriate as some types do not in
fact constitute a family as commonly understood, for example, the life cycle of a person
who never married and never had children.
In place of family life cycle, a life-course perspective proposed by Glen Elder (1978)
provides a more appropriate structure to study individuals, typically embedded within
family or families. A life-course framework necessarily focusses on individuals, but
brings in the family at various stages of a person’s life. While the simple concept of
family life cycle no longer applies, an individual goes through (some or all) the stages of
family life including family formation and dissolution.
Timing Over the Life Course
As Hareven noted (2000, p. 154),
three features of timing are central to the understanding of changes over
the life course: first, the timing of transitions over an individual life path,
particularly the balancing of individuals’ entry into different family and
work roles and their exits from these roles; second, the synchronization of
individual transitions with collective family ones, and third, the
cumulative impact of early life transitions as shaped by historical forces
on subsequent ones. In all these areas, the pace and definitions of timing
hinge upon the social and cultural context in which transitions occur.
Until the mid-1970s, the trend in timing of individual life events was toward age
homogeneity with, for example, modern youth experiencing greater uniformity and more
routinization in the transition to adulthood compared to their forebears (Modell et al.
1976; Hogan 1982; Winsborough 1979). But this trend and the influence of norms and
structures have changed. In a recent study of age norms, Settersten and Hagestad
(1996a,b) concluded that age prescriptions are no longer normative in that people
perceive no major negative consequences for non-adherence to timetables. However, age
structuring of society has by no means vanished (Setterstein 1997). Formal age rules and
laws buttress age structuring with built-in sanctions governing the lives of children (e.g.,
age at entry to and exits from schools) and adults (for example, age at retirement) (Foner
1996). These are corroborated in a study of age variability in life-course transitions of
Canadians, which shows that school completion, and for women, start of regular work
have become more age homogenous (Ravanera et al. 2004). For family events, such as
marriage and births of children, there was a move toward narrower age ranges in
experience of events until the 1970s and subsequently, a widening of age ranges. Age at
transition has become more heterogeneous and weakens the assertion in Foot and
Stoffman’s popular book, Boom, Bust, and Echo (1996, p. 2) that “demographics explain
about two-thirds of everything,” which is largely based on the assumption that cohorts go
through various life events at roughly the same age. Besides the delays, the transitions of
the early life course have become more variable across individuals and more fluid in
terms of defining given transitions.

21

Even greater caution should be taken for forecasts based on later life events (say, homeleaving of children) for which age variability within cohorts is greater than in transitions
in early life (say, first marriage or first birth).
That the occurrence and timing of life-course events hinge on the social and cultural
context is best illustrated by the shift of divorce and cohabitation from socially
unacceptable to being tolerated or acceptable. As Lesthaeghe (1995, p. 57) noted, there is
“historical cumulativity” to the second demographic transition in that the “changes have
been prepared during earlier periods.” The changes in the earlier periods would have been
manifested in the behaviour of the innovators in older birth cohorts (Ravanera et al.
2005b). These innovators would have belonged to higher social classes and had the social
resources to go against cultural norms and the material resources to overcome some of
the adverse outcomes of their behaviour. As the innovative behaviour becomes
widespread and the old norms disappear, the differential by social status vanishes or gets
reversed, which is detected in the behaviour of the younger cohorts. In the case of
divorce, for example, while the number of divorces was small, women with high social
status in the 1926-35 birth cohort have the highest probabilities of dissolving their
marriage, whereas for the 1956-65 birth cohort (forming part of the baby boomers), it is
the middle class women with the highest probabilities (see Figure 3).
A similar diffusion process seems to have happened to cohabitation (Ravanera et al.
2005b).

Figure 3: Cumulative Proportion of Marriage Dissolution by Duration,
by Social Status, 1926-35 and 1956-65 Birth Cohorts, Women Who
Married Directly
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Transition and Trajectories
Understanding changes in the life course involves examining transitions from one stage
to another (or from one social role to another), particularly timing (as shown above).
When multiple events are involved, life-course perspective uses the concept of
trajectories or linked transitions across successive years (Elder 1985; Hagestad 1990;
George 1993). In addition to culture and norms (as illustrated in the case of divorce
above), transitions and trajectories are influenced by one’s own characteristics and by
societal conditions, such as labour market, resources in the communities and one’s own
family, all neatly described by Giele and Elder (1998) as influences of location in time
and place, linked lives and human agency. Furthermore, as Hareven (2000) noted, early
life transitions can have cumulative impact on subsequent ones.
These influences are well illustrated by a study of transition to adulthood of Canadians
born between 1961 and 1980, which involves experience of a number of events at early
life (Ravanera and Rajulton 2004). As shown in Figure 4, women with high social status
(defined by parental education and occupation) experience all events at older ages.
Middle-class women resemble low-status women in their home-leaving, starting work
and union formation, but differentiate themselves from low status women in marriage and
start of parenthood.

Figure 4: Median Age at Transition by Social Status, Women, 1961-80
Birth Cohort, 2001 General Social Survey
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Furthermore, Ravanera and Rajulton (2004) noted that the timing of the eventual
trajectory to a certain state is influenced by events that happen (or did not happen) earlier
in life. For instance, the time spent for other pursuits delays the onset of parenthood.
Young men and women who do not go through the other early life events start
parenthood the earliest, while those who go through graduation from post-secondary
education, regular work and marriage become parents the latest.
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In sum, the life-course perspective, together with its various elements, could be used as a
framework in different ways that ranges from an analysis of life course itself to the use of
life-course stages as organizing elements of a study. In many studies, the life-course stage
is used as a backdrop to examine the consequences of changes in families.
A life-course perspective provides a structure within which to consider earning, caring
and learning the nature and relative importance of which vary over the life course. The
concept of “linked lives” enables us to look at dependence and transfers within families
defined by common residence, within broader family networks, in communities and in
societies. These transfers, occurring within families as defined by residence but also
across households that are linked through family relationships, include child support,
family support of post-secondary education, health benefits for dependants not living in
the household, transfers from grandparents and transfers to married children. These
transfers within families are further linked to transfers occurring in the broader society.
The potential that individuals have for earning and caring affects the likelihood of given
life-course trajectories. In particular, the difficulties in these domains are relevant to
family formation and dissolution. Individual life trajectories are also defined by
alternative approaches to the division of earning and caring activities.

Constrained Decision Making, the Family and the Life Course
Theoretical Approaches to Study of Family
In proposing a framework for analysis, the life course presents itself as an essential
context, especially as one considers the transitions, but also the links across life and the
content of the whole life course. Limiting the framework to only the life course presents
the disadvantage of being excessively general and descriptive. But the life-course
perspective is comprehensive. Specific theoretical approaches often are less so. For
instance, structural–functional, micro-economic and feminist approaches generate useful
questions, but the domain of inquiry is restricted.
The functionalist approach, with its emphasis on the value of having separate institutions
performing specific functions, has a tendency to focus on reproduction, socialization of
the young and stabilizing adult personalities as the key functions of families. The
function of production is seen to be in the domain of the market. That is, while the
promotion of learning and individual well-being are important functions of families, the
functionalist perspective has the disadvantage of viewing work and family, or the public
and private, as separate spheres. Families are relegated to the private spheres, which are
often viewed as less important than the public sphere. There is also a tendency to focus
on a family form based on a gender division of tasks, which is sometimes seen as the only
workable alternative through which families can properly function.
The feminist perspective has had the advantage of observing that families are areas of
both conflict and cohesion and, in particular, that there is not necessarily a “unitary
interest (Feree 1990). Besides observing that women are often exploited by traditional
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family arrangements, the feminist perspective has also focussed on the link between the
two spheres, particularly on the role of women. Kempeneers (1992) made the important
observation that women largely provide the “junction” between work and family,
between the changing needs of production and reproduction, and thus they largely bear
the costs of the inevitable conflict between these two areas of life. For the most part,
women and men are involved in both spheres, but women bear the brunt of the
accommodation between the two spheres. Individual decisions to work, choose an
occupation, have children, work part time, change employment, are a reflection of what
Kempeneers (1992) called the global adjustment processes between the structures of
production and reproduction. At the same time, there is a tendency in feminist theory to
look at families mostly from the perspective of women, and to conclude that women are
disadvantaged in heterosexual families.
The micro-economic perspective has made useful contributions by using an economic
model to consider family questions, such as union formation, childbearing and the
division of work (Becker 1981). This focus on the economic side of family questions has
tended to give more importance to questions of efficiency, and to downplay the
importance of other values like mutuality, equality, cohesion and generativity.
Constrained Decision Making
Micro-economics has provided a powerful theoretical perspective for the study of human
decision making, including choices made in the realm of the family and the individual
life course: marriage, childbearing, divorce, migration, home leaving and the like. But in
the nature of the case, the focus in micro-economic models is on economic variables. In
addition, the theory typically has involved simplifying assumptions that help — and are
even required for — the development of rigorous theory. These assumptions include such
things as impersonal markets, lifetime decision horizons, strict maximization of utility,
unvarying tastes or preferences, unitary decision makers and perfect knowledge. These
assumptions lead to models that often are effective in studying narrowly economic
behaviour and highly rational behaviour in general. But they do not always seem
adequate to the study of the hurly-burly of everyday family life, and life-course behaviour
involving highly emotional areas, such as sex, marriage, divorce and family conflict. The
limitation of the micro-economic theory of rationality in decision making has long been
recognized in the field of psychology that proposes "bounded rationality" as
an alternative (Gilovich et al. 2002; Galotti 2002). Galotti (2002, p. 6) noted, for instance,
that decision-making processes vary depending on a number of factors especially the
specific decision being made, and the characteristics of the individual and group making
the decision. This is not to say that economic models cannot provide important insights
into this realm, but only that they need to be broadened and supplemented to build a more
comprehensive framework for decision making.
The proposed framework retains the central economic notion of constrained choice,
recognizing that humans are not able to choose anything they want — except in fantasy
— but invariably must choose within constraints. Our options are limited, often in ways
that go far beyond the limits suggested by the economic model.1 A few examples suffice
for the purpose of this report.
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•

Family decisions, unlike decisions in the stock market or financial markets, by
definition are not impersonal decisions. In the family, it is not so much the case of a
unitary decision maker trying to maximize her or his own rewards (whether long or
short term). The decision often is a joint decision involving two or more family
members, and typically involves compromise. The rewards and penalties for others
are taken into account, or at least are supposed to be. Altruism is involved: the
rewards and accomplishments of others become a source of satisfaction for the
decision maker.

•

Most people have some general lifetime goals — happiness, wealth, fun, power,
accomplishment — but day-to-day decisions often do not involve a time horizon of a
whole lifetime. Young people, in particular, tend to have shorter time horizons. The
high school drop-out typically does not assess the long-term consequences — good or
bad — of his or her decision. Nor do they possess the knowledge needed to do so,
much less perfect knowledge. Some young couples may make childbearing decisions
with a view to “maximizing lifetime utility,” but even for those who do, their utility
calculus often is incomplete. It can be argued that most young couples ignore “latelife utilities,” such as the rewards of grandparenthood. By the same token, some older
persons ignore what are for them “post-life utilities,” as when they act in ways that
will negatively impact their descendants, for example, voting against support for
better schools, day care, and environmental protection, in favour of lower taxes or
better medical care for the elderly.

•

Many human decisions are barely decisions at all, except in the core sense that the
individual takes some action. Our behaviour is massively shaped by early
socialization, and by internalized values and norms. It is constrained by outside
influences, such as law and government, cultural norms and, increasingly, by the
incessant urgings of advertising and the media. Most people are greatly influenced by
their peers and age mates. We do what we do to a large extent because everyone else
is doing it. Again, young people are particularly subject to peer influence, but it
occurs at all ages and stages of life.

In general, when it comes to our lives and families, most of us do not rationally try to
maximize. We juggle, muddle and compromise, and hope for the best, which is often
good enough.
Decisions regarding key family questions are thus viewed as constrained choices, with
constraints coming from biology, development over the life course, and institutional
context (Seltzer et al. 2005). Expanding on the micro-economic perspective, we include
the role of values and goals in setting normative constraints. From the feminist
perspective, we incorporate the importance of considering the possible conflict of interest
across individuals in families, be they women or men, parents or children, siblings or
generations. At the same time, we do not see individual well-being as the only goal.
When all is said and done, it is what we leave behind at death that counts, or the role that

26

we have played in generating social and cultural capital, which include helping raise the
next few generations and helping build strong neighbourhoods and communities.

Diagram of the Proposed Framework for Research on Families
Figure 5, very loosely patterned after the schematic diagram in Seltzer et al. (2005, p.
911), shows that the three components of the framework discussed above (learning,
earning and caring; the life course; and constrained decision making) border the various
research domains on families. For the sake of simplicity, the contents of the three
components, described in the preceding sections, are not shown in the diagram but should
be presumed as being included in the framework. The fourth side of the framework, left
open in the diagram, relates to outcomes including economic productivity, social
cohesion and generativity over generations (see Figure 1).
The green dashed horizontal lines indicate that the interrelated activities of caring,
earning and learning underpin research on family at any point in the life course, from
early to later life. In most instances, these activities would be in the forefront of the
research be it on the well-being of children, on youth transitions, etc. Furthermore, even
if these activities are not the focus, they would most likely be taken for granted as part of
the research background.

Figure 5: Framework for Research on Families
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The dashed vertical lines represent the connections between the elements of the life
course and the constrained decision-making theory explained above. This grid indicates
that research on families must consider that opportunities and constraints faced by
individuals are conditioned by circumstances of a person’s life course. This would
include consideration of historical time (and thus, the importance of bringing birth cohort
into an analysis), the economic, political or social conditions surrounding the person (or
location in time and place), the socio-economic situation of her/his families with norms
and values that they live by (linked lives), and the individual’s own personal abilities
(human agency). Thus, the family, the community and the state could be the source of
constraints (or conversely, support or opportunities) in the person’s decision-making
process.
The black arrow-tipped lines denote the abstractions (in the form of explanations, models
or theories) formulated through the research process. Necessarily, these lines are
illustrative and the diagram does not include all the possible lines that could be made.
The straight lines pointing to the constrained decision making represent theories
generated in each research domain that are based on constrained choices as explained
above. The curved lines signify explanations and other theories that relate one research
domain (the labels inside the box) with another.
The diagram could be useful in viewing results in each research domain, the interrelations
among the domains, and their interpretations and abstractions in the form of models and
theories. Some of these research findings are presented in Chapter 4 for each broad lifecourse stage. Take, for example, findings on union dissolution.
[The] greater independence of women makes the divorce more viable. [In
the diagram, this would be represented by a black arrow connecting union
dissolution to paid and unpaid work.] Divorces are less likely to occur
when there are young, dependent children because the family is more
economically interdependent at that time [this would be a connecting line
between union dissolution and constrained decision making.] Indeed, both
childless couples and those in the empty nest stage have higher risks of
divorce [signified by a line connecting union dissolution and childbearing,
and a line connecting union dissolution and transitions in later life].
The framework could be useful not only for viewing current available research on
families but on situating other domains in family research that might arise. Boxes and
lines, representing the research domains or topics and the theories and abstractions
arising from the research, could be added to the diagram as needed, but all within bounds
of learning, caring and earning; the life course; and constrained decision making.
Policy Options and Earning, Learning and Caring Over the Life Course
While we return to policy issues at the end of the document, it is useful to indicate some
of the general ways in which the framework of constrained decision making in caring,
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earning and learning over the life course can be a useful lens through which to consider
policy options.
The links between earning and caring are important for understanding the behaviour and
opportunities of adults, who generally give high priority to both family and work; and
they are important to the well-being of children who depend on the earning and caring
roles of parents. The links are crucial to both the material production of the economy and
the demographic reproduction of the population. They are also important to the social
security policies of welfare states that seek to enhance the self-sufficiency of individuals,
promote families as a basic form of security, ensure community services and secure a
broader social safety net.
In planning for interventions, governments often focus on specific target or risk groups.
This presents the disadvantage of suggesting that others are not in need of support and
transfers from community and society. An advantage of focussing on caring, earning and
learning is that it enables us to look at the whole population, including persons not
currently living in families as defined by common residence (sometimes called
“unattached”), who also have family ties of caring, earning and learning, but across
households. Picot and Myles (2005, pp. 25, 28) found that about two thirds of persistent
low-income earners relate to five population groups: lone parents, recent immigrants,
people with work disabilities, unattached persons aged 45 to 64, and Aboriginal persons.
These are also the groups highlighted by Dryden (2005, p. 8). They estimated that 25.9
percent of the population aged 16 to 64 are members of at least one of the five groups.
For various reasons, each group is increasing in relative size.
•

Persons with disabilities are increasing with an aging population, including an aging
work force.

•

The Aboriginal population is increasing with the high fertility and the large relative
size of the population at early adult ages.

•

Recent immigrants have increased with the higher levels of immigration.

•

Lone parents increase with family change of the second demographic transition.

•

Unattached persons over 45 also increase as a function of family change.

To unattached persons over 45 should be added persons of any age who are more or less
kinless, that is, who have no close kin or only a few, or whose close kin are so far away
that many forms of mutual assistance are ruled out.
One could probably divide target groups into those who would be in trouble regardless of
the circumstance, often as a function of poor health, disability or lack of skills, and those
who have or would have difficulties because of the macro-economy and the employment
situation in particular.
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The framework of caring, earning and learning over the life course is thus particularly
useful for the identification of persons at risk or who would be at risk later in life. The
life-course framework, with its concepts of trajectories and linked lives, helps in
appreciating that those in difficulty often started having problems much earlier in life,
typically with deficits in learning, earning and caring transfers across generations.
Focussing on life-course transitions could also help identify the timing when
interventions would be most beneficial.
In the context of the evolving society, various comparisons need to be made. Particular
attention is needed on differentials of earning, caring and learning across generations,
gender, space and culture. For instance, understanding the learning, earning and caring in
immigrant families, as well as the differential life course determinants of immigrants,
could well inform policies.
Policy thinking is too often based on families that are already formed. The life course
approach prompts a look at the bases for family formation, including the systemic bases
for lack of family formation, be it in terms of unions or childbearing. The focus on
earning, learning and caring permits a look at ways in which policy might better support
these activities, and it draws attention to how existing policies of governments and the
private sector may frustrate the potential for earning a living, caring for each other and
integrating the next generation. The treatment of these core activities highlights the need
for co-operation among ministries that are concerned with labour, skills and human
resources on the one hand, and social and caring issues on the other hand. For instance,
the identification of children as a target group brings us to consider the workers who care
for children.
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4. Trends in Caring and Earning Over the Life Course

Childhood (children under 15)
The Place of Children
Family transformations clearly affect children. In the first demographic transition,
children lost their economic value to parents, as economic activities came to depend less
on work within the family, including the labour of children, and the economic role of
children changed from one of producer/dependant to one largely of dependant. Parents
now give their children more than they could ever expect in return (Caldwell 1976). In
the second transition, it became more acceptable for adults to structure their lives in terms
of their own interests rather than in terms of the interest of children. There is a shift in
values and norms from family or child-centred orientations toward more individualism
(Ariès 1980; Lesthaeghe 1983; Roussel 1987). Children are largely viewed as a means
through which adults can receive affective gratification and blossom as individuals
(Romaniuc 1984, p. 64). Folbre (2000) spoke of changing gender norms allowing women
to make decisions on union formation and childbearing based on self-interest.
While children remain important for most people, they are no longer so important as to be
impediments to parental divorce and subsequent fulfilment in other relationships. Keyfitz
(1994, p. 7) proposed that the presence of children, once the main reason not to divorce,
no longer plays that role. Similarly, the formalization of a couple’s relationship through a
legal marriage is no longer seen as necessary before having children, even though such
informal unions have higher rates of dissolution.
Children have benefited from many of the behaviours of adults, especially later
childbearing, fewer children and dual incomes, but they have sometimes suffered from
the greater flexibility in the ability of adults to structure their relationships (Picot et al.
1998; Kerr 1992).
In general, research on adult behaviour and children’s outcomes reinforces the view that
children do best in intact marriages, with both original parents (biological or adoptive)
present. On average, children who experience other patterns — lone parenting, divorce or
separation, informal unions and step-parenting — do less well, although the average
differences are not large.
Marital Quality and Children’s Well-Being
In A Generation at Risk: Growing up in an Era of Family Upheaval, Amato and Booth
(1997) found that the link between parental marital quality and children's well-being is
the most consistent finding. They suggested that both fathers and mothers play key roles
in their children's lives, providing relationships with two adults in the household. Divorce
is advantageous to children under some circumstances; that is, when children are in
highly conflictual marriages. However, they proposed that only a quarter to a third of
marriages that dissolve are in this category. Consequently, when couples dissolve their
relationships at "relatively low thresholds of unhappiness" many children undergo long31

term adverse effects. Thus, "the worse situation for children to be in is either a highconflict marriage that does not end in divorce or a low-conflict marriage that does end in
divorce" (Amato and Booth 1997, p. 238). These influences are not rigid and
deterministic, but on average they affect most aspects of the lives of young adults:
standard of living, size of support network, whether they cohabit, quality of their
marriage, whether the marriage ends in divorce, self-esteem and general happiness with
life. When divorce occurs early in life, there are more consequences for the child's
economic attainment and psychological well-being, and relations with both parents are
weakened. When divorce occurs in adolescence, on average, only the cross-sex parental
relationship is weakened.
Children in Lone-Parent Families
The 1995 Canadian General Social Survey shows that 8.3 percent of children are born to
mothers who are neither married nor cohabiting. By age 15, 34.5 percent of children have
experienced living in a household without both biological parents (Heuveline et al. 2003,
p. 56).
The risk of lone parenthood is much higher when parents have ever cohabited. For
instance, among children born to two-parent families in 1987-88, 8.1 percent had
experienced a family disruption by age 6 if the responding parent had never cohabited,
but 24.6 percent if they had cohabited (Marcil-Gratton 1998, pp. 14, 18). When parents
separate, children born in common-law unions have less contact and receive less financial
support from the non-custodial parent (Marcil-Gratton et al. 1999).
The abundant literature on lone parenthood suggests that the difficulties faced by children
are a function of a breakdown in the transfer of financial, human and social capital
(Beaujot 2000, pp. 287-300). These difficulties were originally traced to the lack of a
male role model, especially for boys, and the lack of the male income in a typical loneparent family. However, the latter explanation is insufficient, since it was found that
children in step-families, presumably with higher income and the presence of both male
and female role models, had similar problems (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1994; Demo and
Acock 1988; Kerr and Michalski 2004).
Research findings on the effects of divorce and separation on the subsequent
achievements of children are mixed. Using the 1979 American National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, Aughinbaugh et al. (2005) found lower achievement among youth who
had undergone a change in their parent’s marital status. Much of this disadvantage
disappeared after controls for background factors, suggesting that it may not reflect the
marital transitions per se. Following British cohorts born in 1958 and 1970, SigleRushton et al. (2005) found a relationship between divorce and achievement, and that, as
divorce becomes more common, there is little change in the magnitude of the
relationship.
In considering this literature, it is important to keep in mind that, on average, children in
both intact and non-intact families do well (Haddad 1998; CCSD 1997). Clearly there are
conditions where children are better off without a given parent, and even instances where
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they are better with neither parent. In many other cases, step-parents and non-residential
parents provide important resources for children. Generally however, children do less
well when they live with one parent or with an informal parent (Beaujot 2000, pp. 296297; Kerr and Beaujot 2003).
Children in Step-Families
The literature on step-parenting and children concludes that, on average, children are not
better off than in lone-parent families (Cherlin and Furstenberg 1994). For instance,
among persons aged 20 to 44 in 1994, the likelihood of having completed high school
was 82 percent if at age 15 they were living with two biological parents, compared to 71
percent with a lone parent and 69 percent if they were living in a blended family or stepfamily (Frederick and Boyd 1998, p. 13). Cooksey and Fondell (1996) found that of all
fathers living with children, the ones who spend the least time with their children are
step-parents. On average, mothers also spend less time with their children after a
separation, and children tend to leave home more quickly. It may be because children do
not benefit from co-parenting when one of the parents is a step-parent (Amato 1998).
Timing of Childbearing and Children’s Well-Being
Children generally do better when a woman or couple’s childbearing is somewhat
delayed rather than occurring early. Based on census data, Lochhead (2000) found that
delayed childbearing is more frequent among women with university education, and there
are increasing income differentials to the disadvantage of younger first-time mothers,
even in two-parent families. Using U.S. data, Martin (2000) found that delayed
childbearers, who tend to have more education, are increasingly likely to raise their
children in intact marriages, while early childbearers are more likely to raise children
outside of marriage. Canadian data also indicate that women under 30 who are formerly
married are much more likely to have children than those who are single, cohabiting or
married (Ravanera 1995, p. 18). Consequently, Bianchi (2000) spoke of two models of
family formation, with one group taking advantage of parental investment from both
mothers and fathers, and the other where fathers are absent and mothers do not have
adequate time and resources to invest in children. Children born from mature parents are
more likely to have a mother with more human capital and a father, in a dual-income
family. This contrasts with the greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those who parent
early.
Young Adulthood (adolescents and youth aged 15-34)
Home Leaving
The median age at home leaving was youngest for the 1951-56 birth cohort, at an average
of 21.5 years for men and 19.9 years for women (Beaujot 2000, p. 97); it has increased in
subsequent cohorts. The 2001 Census reflected this trend, with 41.1 percent of persons
aged 20 to 29 living with their parents in 2001, compared to 27.5 percent in 1981
(Statistics Canada 2002a, p. 27). In their explanation, Lapierre-Adamcyk and her
colleagues (1995) emphasized the more difficult economic times beginning in the early
1980s, and women’s labour market behaviour. Womens’ labour-force participation has
come to resemble that of men, as they often postpone family life to give priority to a
career.
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Young people are more likely to be living at home if they study full time, are
unemployed or have low income. That is, the economic resources of children are
important to home leaving. But patterns are greatly affected by marital status, with
married or formerly married persons less likely to be living with their parents (Boyd and
Norris 1999).
Boyd and Norris (1999) contrasted two views on later home leaving. On the one hand,
home leaving signals other successful transitions to adulthood, like completion of
education, employment, marriage and childbearing. On the other hand, living at home can
benefit young people in making other types of transitions from adolescence to adulthood,
especially completing education, experimenting with relationships and obtaining
employment. Goldscheider and Goldscheider (1999) made a similar point in their book,
The Changing Transition to Adulthood: Leaving and Returning Home. They observed
that leaving home and establishing independent residence is seen as a critical step in the
transition to adulthood, clearly marking a shift from dependence to greater autonomy. On
the other hand, they noted that early home leaving can result in lower transfers to children
and lower levels of living.
Most authors focus on the economic factors associated with a delay in home leaving. But
there are also cultural factors making parental homes suitable to older children. In
particular, the narrower generation gap and more egalitarian relationships between
parents and children seem to allow many young adults to live in the parental home more
comfortably. Smaller families also encourage later home leaving (Mitchell et al. 1989).
As another example of the importance of values and expectations, Goldscheider and
Goldscheider (1993) found that the attitudes of both parents and children matter
considerably in the decision to leave home. At the same time, they found little
relationship between measures of parental resources and the timing of home leaving,
except that home leaving to attend post-secondary education is more likely when parents
have more resources (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999, p. 209). Also, parental
resources do not predict children’s returning home, that is, “parents’ willingness to share
their home is not a function of their affluence” (Goldscheider and Goldscheider 1999, p.
209).
Many commentators talk about late home leaving in negative terms; for instance, Boyd
and Pryor (1989) used the term “cluttered nest.” In some regards, the delay in home
leaving is counter to the “idea of progress” underlying family trends, as implied
especially by the growth of individualism. However, from the point of view of children,
early home leaving can pose problems for completion of high school, establishing
savings and receiving transfers from parents. Based on data from Sweden, Bernhardt et
al. (2003) found that early home leaving is linked to lower educational aspirations and
lower educational attainment, which would be particularly the case when the departure is
due to a push factor, such as family conflict. Such early departures lead to a reduction in
the quantity and quality of contact with both parents, and have negative consequences for
successful career patterns and stable families. Bernhardt et al. (2003) further found that
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when children live with a divorced parent without a step-parent, and family conflict is
low, the risk of early leaving is not higher than in an intact family.
On the other hand, Palomba (2001) found that the very late home leaving found in
Southern Europe may be detrimental to the independence of young people. Contrasts
across countries suggest that home leaving is later when children depend on transfers
within the family, and earlier if there are more state transfers, as in Nordic countries
(Reher 1998; Breen and Buchmann 2002; Iacovou 2002). For men born around the
1960s, the median age at home leaving ranges from 20 years in Sweden to 26 or 27 years
in Italy and Spain (Billari et al. 2001). Independence from parents at affordable costs is
reduced when there is a poor housing market and lack of rental accommodation. In
contrast, greater social transfers to young people, as occurs in Sweden, allows more
independence from parents.
Out of School
The exact time of completion of formal education is difficult to mark, because the future
may bring a return to the classroom, but there can be no doubt that this transition is
occurring later. In “100 Years of Education,” Clark (2000, p. 4) found that in 1911 only
about one percent of persons aged 20 to 24 was attending school, which increased to
eight percent in 1961, but 48 percent in 1996. In the period 1976-2001, the percent of
persons attending school full time at ages 16 to 24 increased from 34.0 percent to 47.7
percent for men, and from 30.7 percent to 52.5 percent for women (Morissette 2002, p.
33). For men and women combined, a third were attending school full time in 1976, but
this increased to half of the age group in 2001. The greater increase for women also
applies to ages 25 to 29, which saw 2.0 percent attending full time in 1976 and 7.3
percent in 2001, while men’s rates went from 4.0 to 7.7 percent.
The median age at school completion increased from 18.8 years for the cohort of women
born in 1941-45, to 21.8 years for the one born in 1971-75 (Ravanera et al. 1998). For
men over these cohorts, the median ages were rather stable, at about 22 years (Ravanera
et al. 2002, p. 299).
Of the several transitions in education, it is high school graduation that has especially
increased, with 88 percent of the population now completing high school (Bowlby and
McMullen 2002). Wanner (1999) found over cohorts born from 1905 to 1969 that the
transition from high school to post-secondary education has increased, but the one from
entering post-secondary to completion of a post-secondary degree has actually declined
for men.
The transition to post-secondary continues to increase, with 62 percent of high school
graduates going on to post-secondary education within a year, and another 20 percent
after only a one-year delay (Tomkowicz and Bushnik 2003). International comparisons
show that Canada is at the very top of countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in terms of the proportion of the population at
various age groups that has completed a post-secondary qualification, diploma or degree.
For instance, at age 25 to 34, half of the Canadian population has obtained such a
qualification, compared to an average of around 25 percent for European countries
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(Beaujot and Kerr 2004, p. 249). Other comparisons show that Canada has particularly
high enrolment rates at ages 18 to 21, but by age 24 it is about in the middle of OECD
countries (Fussell 2002, p. 21)
There is much pressure on young people to finish high school and to obtain postsecondary education. There are continued reports that job growth will be in the high skill
area, and that Canada will need to import more skilled labour from abroad. The 2002
Survey of Approaches to Educational Planning found that the vast majority of parents (93
percent) expected their children to complete post-secondary education, and three quarters
of parents expected them to obtain a university degree; half of these parents were saving
to help their children in this regard, with another 30 percent reporting that they planned to
start saving in the future (Shipley et al. 2003). The savings are often small in comparison
to the actual cost of post-secondary education. In effect, families are confronted on a dayto-day basis with competing needs: immediate consumption, long-term saving for
parental retirement and long-term savings for their children’s education.
While longer schooling is clearly involved in the delay of early life transitions, it is
noteworthy that for men the median age of school completion for the 1971-75 cohort was
21.5 years, while that of first union was more than 25 years, and first childbirth over 31
years (extending the trends from older cohorts shown in Ravanera et al. 2002, p. 299).
Similarly, the 1971-75 cohort of women completed their education at a median age of
21.8 years, compared to 23 years for first union and about 28 years for birth of first child
(Ravanera et al. 1998, pp. 187-189). Women’s longer education may be delaying men’s
entry into first unions, but childbearing seems to be delayed much beyond the ages when
education is completed for both genders.
In their study of early life transitions of Canadian youth, Ravanera and her colleagues
(2003) observed that young people with more parental resources, as measured through
mothers working and living in communities with more resources, are especially likely to
complete their schooling later. In contrast, children who do not live with both parents to
age 15 leave school a year earlier, while they start work and leave home two years earlier.
In their analysis of the factors affecting union formation in Canada, Turcotte and
Goldscheider (1998) observed the increased importance of higher educational attainment
for women’s entry into marriage. School enrolment was found to have become a bigger
impediment to first union formation for younger cohorts.
Comparisons across countries suggest similar results, highlighting the importance of
distinguishing educational attainment and school enrolment. That is, educational
attainment has sometimes positive, sometimes negative and often no net effect on
women’s family formation, but educational enrolment impedes marriage (Sorensen 1995,
p. 229). For men, greater educational attainment increases the likelihood of union and
family formation (Corijn 2001, p. 11). Educational enrolment involves a high degree of
dependence on parents, so young people of both genders do not consider themselves
sufficiently mature for marriage (Blossfeld 1995). An Ontario survey found similar
normative expectations that young people attending school are not ready to get married
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(Beaujot 2000, pp. 108-110). That is, the extension of education and the narrowing of the
gender gap have profound effects on the early life course. Women’s increased education
is delaying union formation for both genders.
Into the Labour Force
The transition into the labour force typically takes place over a number of years, as young
people who are still students begin working on a part-time basis. The OECD (1997) has
proposed that the starting age of the school-to-work transition can be estimated as the last
age at which more than 75 percent of youths are only attending school; that is, not
working at all. The end of the transition would occur when more than half are only
working. On the basis of the Labour Force Survey, excluding the summer months,
Bowlby (2000, p. 44) estimated that this transition starts at about age 16, while the end of
the transition has moved from age 21 in 1984 to age 23 in 1998. Thus the transition now
takes place over seven years, and not until age 23 is half of the cohort working without
also going to school.
Among youths aged 15 to 24, the largest category in 1984 was those who were working
and not attending school (37 percent of the total), but by 1998 the largest category was
those who were attending school but not working (40 percent of the total). Those both
attending school and working had increased, while those neither attending school nor
working had declined over this period (Bowlby 2000, p. 43). This confirms that fewer
had completed the transition from school to work.
Besides the higher proportion attending school full time, the period 1981-2001 saw a
drop in the proportion of non-students employed full time, among persons under the age
of 30 (Morissette 2002, p. 33). At ages 16 to 24, the proportion of men non-students
working full time declined over this period from 77.6 to 69.1 percent, while for women
the decline was from 61.0 to 56.3 percent. At ages 25 to 29, there were again declines for
men, from 88.1 percent working full time in 1981 to 83.8 percent in 2001. At this age
group, women made significant gains, from 50.9 to 66.2 percent working full time.
Morissette then calculated the earnings of full-year, full-time employees and found
declines over this period for both age groups of men and stability for women.
Other studies confirmed the disadvantage of younger men, especially in comparison to
older men (Morissette 1998; Picot 1998). The proportion working, the hours worked per
week and the wages per hour all declined relative to older men. Picot and Sweetman
(2005) and Myles (2005) spoke of the disadvantaged situation of recent entrants to the
labour force, be they from within Canada or from abroad. This is seen to be affecting
men’s transition to marriage. For instance, Oppenheimer and Lewin (1999) argued that
the transition to marriage depends on men’s earnings and their career mobility.
Tanner and Yabiku (1999) concluded that contemporary youth’s transition to adulthood
is delayed not as a function of their having different goals, because the goals of stable
jobs remain dominant. It is the economic realities that frustrate their achievement of these
goals. In their analysis, Turcotte and Goldscheider (1998) found that working is
increasingly important for entering any kind of union, since union formation increasingly
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requires the earning power of both partners. The labour market disadvantages of young
men reduce union formation.
Union Formation
The term “union formation” in this context refers to formal marriage or to cohabitation
(also referred to generally as “common-law unions,” in French unions libres). Such
unions are the most common pathway to the start of a family or family household,
although there are others. For example, two lone parents might share a household without
becoming intimate partners or two siblings may live together.
With respect to family formation through unions, the main trend is toward delays in
union formation and a lower proportion of persons in a union at given ages. There are
delays not only in marriage, but also in cohabitation and, thus, in union formation as a
whole. For instance, as shown in Table 2, at age 35 to 39, 83.8 percent of men and 81.7
percent of women were in unions in 1981, compared to 60.2 percent of men and 65.1
percent of women in 2001.

Table 2: Marital Status of Population by Sex and Five-Year Age
Group, Canada, 1981 and 2001 (in percent)
Never Married
Males Females

Cohabiting
Males Females

Marital Status
All Unions
Married
Males Females

Separated, Widowed,
Total
or Divorced
Males Females
Males Females

1981
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64

98.4
71.9
32.0
15.0
9.3
7.8
7.5
7.8
7.8
7.6

93.3
51.1
20.0
10.5
7.3
6.1
5.8
6.0
6.3
7.1

0.7
7.1
8.1
6.0
4.7
3.6
2.8
2.1
1.6
1.2

2.9
9.4
7.1
4.7
3.6
2.8
2.1
1.7
1.2
0.9

0.7
19.8
55.6
73.1
79.1
81.2
81.8
81.6
84.6
84.3

3.6
36.5
65.9
75.5
78.1
79.2
78.8
76.4
75.6
67.8

1.4
26.9
63.7
79.1
83.8
84.8
84.6
83.7
86.2
85.5

6.5
45.9
73.0
80.2
81.7
82.0
80.9
78.1
76.8
68.7

0.1
1.2
4.3
6.0
6.8
7.4
7.9
8.4
5.9
7.0

0.2
3.0
7.0
9.4
11.0
11.9
13.3
15.8
16.9
24.2

2001
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64

98.9
85.3
53.3
30.8
21.3
15.9
11.7
8.5
6.7
6.1

96.9
73.3
38.9
21.1
14.6
11.4
9.0
7.2
6.0
5.4

0.7
9.7
19.1
17.4
14.8
12.3
10.2
8.7
7.4
5.6

2.3
15.4
20.0
16.3
13.7
11.4
9.3
7.2
5.4
3.4

0.3
4.5
25.6
47.3
56.8
62.2
66.2
70.1
73.0
75.6

0.6
10.2
37.3
55.1
60.7
63.3
65.0
66.4
66.5
65.2

1.0
14.2
44.7
64.7
71.6
74.5
76.5
78.8
80.5
81.2

3.0
25.6
57.3
71.4
74.4
74.7
74.3
73.6
71.9
68.6

0.2
0.5
2.0
4.5
7.1
9.7
11.8
12.6
12.8
12.8

0.2
1.1
3.8
7.5
10.9
13.9
16.7
19.2
22.1
26.0

Source: Beaujot and Kerr (2004, Table 9.4).

As shown in Table 1 earlier, the median age at first marriage declined from 23.0 years for
brides and 26.3 years for grooms in 1941, to just over 21 and 23 years respectively for
those marrying in the early 1970s, then increased to median ages of 27 and 29 in 2002.
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The macro-economic context plays an important role. Delays in union formation can be
linked to the increased importance for youth to invest longer in themselves before they
invest in reproduction, and to the lack of opportunities. While the formation of a stable
intimate relationship is an important priority for most people, the diversity of available
alternatives may reduce the relative desirability of marriage or cohabiting unions.
Differences between Cohabitation and Marriage
The fluidity of the transition associated with home leaving, with the greater frequency of
returning home, is matched by that in union formation that includes marriage and
cohabitation, as well as non-residential intimate relationships, some of them longstanding. For instance, 63 percent of first unions among women who were aged 20 to 29
in 2001 were common law rather than marriages (Statistics Canada 2002b). Among
women aged 30 to 34, 4.7 percent were in a cohabiting union in 1981; in 2001, 16.3
percent of women of the same age were cohabiting (see Table 2).
For society, the meaning and nature of cohabitation relative to marriage evolves in stages,
especially in terms of social acceptability (Kiernan 2002). This evolution would start
from a time when cohabitation is an unconventional or offbeat lifestyle associated with a
small minority, to a time when many persons in some cultures view cohabitation as a
reasonable prelude to marriage to test and strengthen relationships. Eventually, we see
cohabitations that last longer, that often include childbearing, and that are less
distinguishable from marriages. By the turn of the century, this evolution had proceeded
further in Quebec than in the rest of Canada (Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2004;
Kerr et al. 2005). In their typology, Dumas and Bélanger (1997) saw an increase both in
cohabitations of low durability, and in common-law unions that last longer without being
converted into marriages. Relationships of less durability become more likely to end as
cohabitations rather than being converted into marriages (Dumas and Bélanger 1997).
While cohabitations take on a variety of forms, from those that are equivalent to marriage
to those that might better be seen as an alternative to living single, two things are clear.
First, cohabiting unions are twice as likely to end in separation as first marriages
(Statistics Canada 2002b). Second, Wu (1999) proposed that cohabitation delays
marriage mostly because people who are marrying have a longer period of premarital
relationships.
The process of union formation is not completely understood, but at least two models
have gained some currency. In one model, marriage would be selective of persons with
higher status, especially for men. Men with lower status would be less desirable as
marriage partners. In this model, marriage may bring a greater division of labour, since
men with higher status take more responsibility for earning a living. In a second model,
cohabitation is better viewed as an alternative to marriage, and it may signal greater
departure from a traditional division of labour. Cohabitation would then imply less
differentiation between women and men, or it would be selective of women with higher
socio-economic status compared to married women. While having children is an option
in this alternative, the level of childbearing remains significantly lower than in married
unions. These models may apply differently in the United States and Canada. For
instance, women in the United States whose first unions were cohabitations tended to
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have less education, but in Canada they tended to have higher education (Torrey and
Eberstadt 2005, p. 46). Comparing various economic characteristics, Kerr et al. (2005)
proposed that the second model applies more to Quebec than to the rest of Canada.
The lower durability of marriages preceded by cohabitation has largely been interpreted
in terms of selectivity, with persons who are willing to cohabit before marriage also being
more willing to separate from marriages (e.g., urban residents, university graduates,
persons with no ties to organized religion). When cohabitation is less common, it may
also be that individuals involved in these unions feel they need to legitimate their
conjugal behaviour by formalizing their unions through marriages. As cohabitation
becomes more common, and as we see relationships of less durability ending as
cohabitations rather than being converted into marriages, the stability of relationships
preceded by cohabitation may become more similar to direct marriages. Nonetheless,
when we put all relationships together, the durability of relationships is doubtless
declining. That is, the greater frequency of short-lived cohabitations and of cohabitations
that are not converted into marriages compensates for the relative stability of marriages,
where the proportion divorcing has not changed substantively since the late 1980s.
Fertility is consistently higher for married than cohabiting couples (Dumas and Bélanger
1997, p. 163). Using data from 1985-1994 in the 1995 General Social Survey, for the
country as a whole, the total fertility rate in married couples was double that of
cohabiting couples, for women aged 20 to 44. The differences were smaller in Quebec
where the total fertility rate was 85 percent higher for married than cohabiting, compared
to 120 percent higher in the rest of Canada.
Cohabitations are somewhat more stable in Quebec, but the now relatively infrequent
direct marriages remain the most stable. Cohabiting couples who give birth to a child also
tend to be somewhat more stable than those who remain without children (Wu and
Balakrishnan 1995). However, family change has brought less stability in the lives of
children. Following children to age 6 through the National Longitudinal Survey of
Children and Youth, in those unions that remained cohabitations, 37 percent saw the
dissolution of their parent’s union in Quebec, and 61 percent in Ontario. While commonlaw unions are more stable in Quebec, they remain considerably less stable than other
unions involving children, be they direct marriages, persons who cohabited before
marriage, or cohabiting persons who married after the child was born (Marcil-Gratton
and Le Bourdais 1999).
Determinants of Unions
Becker (1981, 1991) suggested the delay of marriage can be attributed to lower gains to
marriage when there is less gender specialization in the division of labour of couples.
This “independence hypothesis” would argue in particular that women who have higher
achieved status would be less likely to marry, because they have less to gain from
marriage.
Looking at the situation in the United States before 1980, Goldscheider and Waite (1986)
interpreted the results as implying that men with more achieved status are more likely to
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“buy marriage” as part of the package, while women may use their higher education and
occupational status to “buy out of marriage.” However, with most relationships taking the
form of the two-worker model, achieved status has since come to increase the likelihood
of marriage for both men and women (Goldscheider and Waite 1991; Sweeney 1997).
Canadian results show similar changes over time, implying shifting dynamics associated
with forming relationships. Using the 1995 General Social Survey, Turcotte and
Goldscheider (1998) found that more highly educated women from the pre-1950 cohorts
were less likely to marry, but the opposite applied in the post-1950 cohorts. For men of
both cohorts, education was positively related to entry into unions, but the relationship
declined in importance. Mongeau and her colleagues (2001) also found that the Becker
model applied to older cohorts, where women were likely to marry sooner if they had
more work interruptions. However, in the more recent cohorts, uncertainties at work as
measured through significant work interruptions reduce men’s likelihood of marriage,
and they increase the likelihood that women will cohabit rather than marry. Given that
union formation increasingly requires the earning power of both partners, we can expect
to see an increased importance of education to women’s entry into marriage, while
working becomes increasingly important to entry into any type of union. In Quebec,
where cohabitation is particularly high, women’s employment increases their likelihood
of forming a common-law union (Bélanger and Turcotte 1999).
That is, it would appear that the Becker model does not apply to younger cohorts. That
model expected fewer marriages when there were fewer gains associated with gender
specialization, and as women became more economically independent. In her alternate
theory of marriage timing, Oppenheimer (1988) did not attribute the delay of marriage to
lower gains to marriage, nor to an independence hypothesis wherein women with more
status would use that status to remain more independent. Instead, Oppenheimer (1988,
1997) attributed the delay to the difficulty that young men have had in establishing their
work lives, and to the importance attached to the work lives of both spouses. Young
adults will search longer for a spouse if there is a longer period of uncertainty before their
economic future is defined. They also search longer when they lack knowledge regarding
the economic future of their potential spouse. In a qualitative survey that asked when it
was best to start a union or get married, respondents from London, Ontario, and the
surrounding area largely said that it was best to wait until education is completed, and
work lives are being established (Beaujot and Bélanger 2001). Given the importance of
work to a couple’s life style, the delayed entry into relationships follows on the longer
period of education and the difficulty in establishing secure jobs.
Besides these economic questions, marriage may pose a different priority for young
people. In “Sure, I’d Like to Get Married ... Someday,” White (1999) proposed that there
is a worldwide retreat from marriage, as men know that marriage requires greater
commitment to a stable work life, and as women know that they cannot depend on the
stability of the union. However, survey evidence would suggest that young people attach
much importance to living in a stable relationship (Lapierre-Adamcyk 1990). Attitudes
and values clearly play a role in the entry into cohabitations and marriages, but these
attitudes indicate strong expectations and preferences to enter relationships (Milan 2003).
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That is, the delay would not be associated with a retreat from relationships, but rather
with the complexity of achieving two rewarding jobs and a stable relationship.

Box 2: On the Social and Economic Foundations of Family Formation
The human urge to reproduce is shared with other biological species, presumably the result of evolution.
Without adequate reproduction, humans would have gone extinct. But any biological urge is overlaid by
cultural values and social norms, and is contingent for its expression on favourable material circumstances.
Virtually all human societies have encouraged marriage and childbearing as the norm, both for women and
men. But they have differed in the extent of this encouragement, and have imposed some restrictions.
In Canada today, there are various formal restrictions on marriage (age; mental capacity for consent; an existing
marriage), but also informal norms regarding suitability for marriage and childbearing. There is a general notion
that an individual or couple should be more or less independent and self-sufficient before undertaking to start a
family. There is still some gender asymmetry, the sense that the male must be at least an equal partner is providing
necessary support. Though seldom voiced directly, there is the not uncommon feeling that individuals and couples
should not bring children into poverty, although its is hard to see what else a poor young couple could do in the
short term, short of not having children at all. Further research is needed to document these attitudes and
informal norms, their sometimes rapid changes, and the sources of the greatest normative influence – peers,
parents, the media, etc.
Some of the past incentives to marriage no longer exist, or have been greatly attenuated. In the not-to-distant
past, access to regular sexual intimacy was for the most part limited to marriage. And not a few marriages
were occasioned by pregnancy. Contemporary norms tolerate sex, including cohabitation, without marriage,
and marriage without children. Modern fertility control (contraception and abortion) means that one can have
sex without pregnancy or birth. Family formation is much more a matter of choice rather than just going with
the flow of social pressure and custom.
The decision to form a serious partnership or to start a family is not a completely rational one. But most
people show some forethought before undertaking the fateful step of parenthood. Couples consider how many
children they might eventually want, the costs of achieving and raising that number, and the resources
available to support a family. Can a young person or couple look into the future with confidence that they will
be able to support themselves and children? Some couples will not bother to think ahead. And some, with
substantial means, will find the money costs – though not necessarily the time costs – of having children
inconsequential. For most young people, the matter merits and gets serious consideration.
What are the prospects facing younger Canadians today, the potential parents of tomorrow's families?
Although Canada is a prosperous society and widely considered one of the most livable in the world (in terms
of the UN Human Development Index), a number of features would seem to militate against timely family
formation by the average young Canadian.
Chief among these factors are: (1) a decline in the quality of available jobs, with stagnant real wages, less job
security and fewer benefits;( 2) a gradual erosion of the 'social safety net.'
These trends are documented in a recent report from a major Canadian bank (TD Bank Economics, 2005b).
The report deals specifically with Ontario, but clearly has wider relevance. The analysts begin with the
observation that Canadian governments have made great strides in improving the financial security of our
oldest and youngest citizens, but that '…alongside these gains, there has been a steady erosion in income
support for working age adults' [p.i]. They continue.
In the face of an increasingly challenging labour market environment, marked by stagnant wage
growth, a reduction in the share of the labour force covered by the federal government's Employment
Insurance [EI] program has left unemployed adults with fewer resources to fall back on when they
lose their jobs. And no one has been harder hit than those forced to turn to social assistance, after a
decade of cuts to welfare delivered by provincial governments intent on trimming deficits [p.i].
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Box 2 (Cont’d): On the Social and Economic Foundations of Family Formation
The report focuses on the role of government income security programs. Another report could be written,
of course, on the development of what they describe as 'an increasingly challenging labour market
environment.' While some market forces are irresistible, other challenges in the current market are the
result of systematic efforts to reduce labour costs – by laying off larger numbers of workers, by cutting
wages, by exporting jobs to low-wage nations, by contracting out, by cutting back or even reneging on
pension benefits. The challenges facing the younger worker looking for a good, secure job are not
accidents of history. At least in part, they are a result of economic policy in the private sector.
Late teen-agers and young adults may well have experienced the above trends, if only indirectly through
job difficulties of family, including parents and older siblings. They will have more direct experience of
relatively high unemployment rates, from incidents of unemployment affecting them or their age mates.
Unemployment has always been somewhat higher among young adults, and that trend continues, but is
now combined with a decline in the quality of jobs noted above. In the period 1995-2000, unemployment
among persons under 25 was roughly double that among those 25 and over. The September 2005 Labour
Force Survey (Statistics Canada, October 7, 2005) reports the lowest overall unemployment rate in almost
three decades, but notes an increase for persons 15-24 to 12.7 percent, roughly double the overall rate. It
is possible that the true rates might be higher than the measured rates, with some youth not even looking
for a job, and others continuing their education in part because of a shortage of good jobs.
The current mix of public and private policies relating to income security is particularly hard on young
males and on single persons. Young men ages 20-24 were recently reported as having unemployment
rates more than half again as high (10% vs. 6.4) as young women of the same ages (Statistics Canada,
2005).
Such unemployment rates, combined with low job quality for many of those employed, militate against
career development, savings, retirement of educational loans, etc. Young people who might wish to start
a family will not be well-positioned to do so. This is especially the case for young men. Could this be a
factor in the high number of lone-mother families?
Single [that is, currently unmarried] persons also do not fare well under current welfare programs. The
TD Bank report cited earlier (2005b) notes that recent Ontario welfare reforms 'worsen the gap between
single adults and lone parents' (p.22), making it extremely difficult for the single person to work his or her
way out of poverty. They conclude that 'directing additional welfare resources toward single
adults…would deliver the biggest "bang for the buck", particularly given the support these individuals get
from the rest of the income security system' (p.23).
Meaningful reform in the above systems to make them more youth-friendly will not be easy. As the babyboomers become seniors, they will wield enormous political power, as noted on p.30 of Knowledge Plan,
2005-2008. The larger relative number of seniors, combined with their high voting participation, in fact,
sets the stage for a regression in the well-being of young and middle-aged adults, if the elderly were
consistently to vote their own interests. Restraint on the part of the elderly and courage on the part of
politicians will be needed to avoid such regression. The classic – and convincing – analysis of the process
is by Preston (1984).
Nor is it certain that large numbers of young people would take advantage of improved economic
circumstances to begin families. But some significant number would, and it would redound to their own
fulfillment and well-being, as well as pushing macro-demographic indicators in the right direction.
A variety of pronatalist programs have come into being in Europe, partly in response to extreme low fertility,
and some of them appear to be having some effect (see Saunders, 2005).
Thomas K. Burch
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Into Parenthood
While there is certain fluidity to home leaving and union formation, making the transition
difficult to mark, the same does not apply to the transition to parenthood, especially for
women. The transition to parenthood involves much change in people’s lives, and it is
highly significant because of the associated permanence and obligation. One can have exspouses and ex-jobs but it is not as easy to have ex-children. Even for men, parenthood is
one of the most permanent commitments (Rindfuss et al. 1988).
The significance of the transition to parenthood can also be seen in how people use their
time over a 24-hour day. The change from being single to partnered brings a small
increase in the time spent doing housework for men, and a larger increase for women,
with a decline in the time women spend doing paid work in some countries (Gauthier and
Furstenberg 2002). The transition to parenthood brings a definite increase in the time
women spend in housework and child care, with a reduction of time in paid work. Men
also experience an increase in time spent in housework and child care (Beaujot and Liu
2005).
The delay in childbearing can be seen in the average age of women at first birth, which
increased from 23.4 in 1976 to 27.6 in 2001 (Lochhead 2000; Statistics Canada 2003). In
1976, only nine percent of first-time mothers were over 30; by 2001 the figure was 34
percent.
From a cohort rather than calendar year perspective, the median age of men at their first
birth was 26.5 in the 1941-45 birth cohort, compared to 31.2 in the 1961-65 cohort
(Beaujot 2000, p. 97). For women, this median age increased from 23.3 in the 1941-45
cohort to 27.8 in the 1966-70 cohort.
The delay in childbearing can also be seen in the reductions of fertility for women aged
15 to 19, across a number of countries (Teitler 2002, p. 142). There are also important
variations, with Canada’s rate being significantly lower than that of the United States, but
similar to the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, and higher than that of many
European countries. For instance, the birth rate at ages 15 to 19 is close to 5 per 1,000
women in the Netherlands and Sweden, compared to 16 in Canada and 49 in the United
States. The Canadian rates have declined from 34.0 births per 1,000 women in 1976. This
is not a function of delays in the age of first intercourse, which has been declining for
both sexes, reaching a median age of about 16 to 17 years (Teitler 2002, p. 136).
Presumably, more Canadian young people are using effective contraception. And, in the
Canadian case, about half of conceptions to teenagers are aborted (Dryburgh 2000).
In absolute terms, the strongest declines in fertility have been at ages 20 to 24, from 108
births per 1,000 women in 1976 to 56 in 2001 (see Figure 6). Until 1969 the age group 20
to 24 had the highest fertility rate, but it has since been bypassed by the age group 25 to
29. Conversely, since the mid-1970s, fertility has increased at ages 30 to 39. This is
clearly counter to the long-term trend during the first demographic transition, from 1870
to 1945, where the largest fertility declines were for women over 35.
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The changed age pattern of childbearing, or the delay of fertility, has largely been
associated with women’s increased education and labour force participation. Particularly
in the period 1963-89, Rindfuss and his colleagues (1996) observed that women with a
college education in the United States experienced dramatic shifts toward later ages at
childbearing. With regards to males, Ravanera and Rajulton (2000) found that men of
higher status start parenting later and finish sooner. Lochhead (2000, p. 42) observed that
the distribution of first births shifts further to higher ages for women who have more
education. He pointed especially to powerful economic and career incentives to delay
childbirth and family formation, for many young women and men. Fussell (2002)
attributed both later and less childbearing to more economic and psychological insecurity
for men and more labour force participation for women.

Figure 6: Fertility Rate by Age Group, Canada, 1972-2000
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The data from the 1998 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics suggested that the
economic advantages associated with delaying parenthood have increased for younger
generations of mothers (Drolet 2002). The 1998 Survey found no significant association
between the timing of marriage and wages, but the timing of parenthood did make a
difference for women’s wages. Controlling for other variables, the wages of women who
had their children later did not differ from those who had no children, but women who
had their children earlier than the average for their level of education, field of study,
urban size and birth year, had lower average wages. Women who delayed their births had
accumulated more years of full-time work experience (Drolet 2003).
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The relation between labour force participation and childbearing probably involves two
models. In a model that was more relevant to older cohorts, women who had less labour
market integration were more likely to have children. However, in younger cohorts, we
may be seeing women delay childbearing until they are better integrated in the labour
force, and consequently it would be the women who are better integrated in the labour
market who would be having children. This model is encouraged by provisions for
parental leave and child care, which are oriented toward employed parents. Certain
occupations are more conducive to the second model, with women in education or
nursing having more flexibility to have a child compared to those in law or engineering.
In a qualitative study based on women who graduated from university in 1985, Ranson
(1998) found that those in education could take advantage of leaves, and guaranteed
return to their employment, while women in law or business found that they had to
concentrate on their careers to the point that they had put off childbearing.
Mid-Adulthood (prime productive ages, 35-59)
Union Stability
Trends in Union Dissolution
While there are dissolutions of unions at various points of the life course, they are treated
in this section on mid-adulthood. Marital instability that was previously due to premature
deaths now occurs through voluntary means. Separation and divorce have certainly
increased since the 1960s, but it is also important to appreciate that the most common
situation is for people to be married only once. In terms of family units, the 1995 General
Social Survey found that 70 percent of families with children included both biological
parents, while 22 percent involved only one parent and eight percent were step-families
with one biological parent and a step-parent (Beaujot and Kerr 2004, p.222).
It is estimated that at least one third of marriages taking place in the last two decades
will end in divorce within 25 years (Péron et al. 1999). This is taken from the observation
that among persons who married in 1968-69, 29.3 percent had divorced within 25 years
(Dumas and Bélanger 1996, p. 35). The trends at shorter marriage duration involve higher
propensities to divorce for subsequent cohorts. For instance, within 10 years of marriage,
the 1968-69 cohort had 11.4 percent divorces, while the 1983-84 marriage cohort had
18.4 percent divorces. Life table techniques that extrapolate on the basis of the data from
a given year suggest that there was a stabilization of divorces between 1986 and 1991 at
slightly more than 30 percent of marriages (Nault and Bélanger 1996, p. 18). The
comparison of divorces by duration of marriage also suggests that there may be the
beginnings of a decline in the propensity to divorce (Bélanger and Dumas 1998, p. 35). In
part, this may be because marriages are becoming more selective, with more cohabitation
and less marriage. Compared to other countries, Canadian divorce rates are higher than in
Japan, France or Germany, roughly the same as those of Sweden and the United
Kingdom, and considerably lower than in the United States.
Types of Unions
Given the spread of cohabitation, and a trend toward cohabitations of longer duration,
sometimes as a substitute for marriage, it is useful to look at various patterns of
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combination of cohabitation and formal marriage, since separations vary considerably by
pattern. Using life-table techniques based on data from 1995, Belanger and Dumas (1998)
estimated that after 25 years, 20 percent of marriages not preceded by cohabitation have
separated, compared to 40 percent of unions that involved a marriage preceded by
cohabitation. For all unions that started as cohabitations, regardless of their involving a
marriage, the life table estimates indicate that 65 percent are expected to separate, and
this rises to 85 percent for unions that remained as cohabitation. Even after five years
there are significant differences, with half of unions having dissolved if they involved
cohabitations that were not converted into a marriage, compared to only five percent of
dissolution for unions that started as a marriage not preceded by cohabitation. According
to the 2001 General Social Survey, more than 30 percent of persons aged 40 to 59 who
started their conjugal relationships through marriage are expected to separate, but the
number is twice as high for those who started with cohabitation (Statistics Canada 2002b,
p. 4). As noted earlier, this statistical relationship reflects more the personal
characteristics of persons who cohabit than a causal effect of cohabitation as such on
subsequent union dissolution.
Determinants of Union Dissolution
The understanding of divorce trends can be placed in the context of instrumental and
expressive factors in marriage, and the changing nature of the marriage commitment.
Since there has been a decrease in the instrumental functions fulfilled by families,
families have less holding them together. This is particularly true in the economic domain
where families now involve less economic interdependence in a family enterprise, such
as a farm or small business. For the wife in particular, it is much easier to get out of an
unhappy marriage if she is employed in a two-income family. Moreover, if she no longer
receives her status from her marriage, the prospect of moving out is less negative. Stated
differently, the greater independence of women makes divorce more viable. By the same
token, the greater viability of divorce forces women to become more independent. For
similar instrumental reasons, divorces are less likely to occur when there are young,
dependent children, because the family is more economically interdependent at that time.
Indeed, both childless couples and those in the empty nest stage have higher risks of
divorce (Rowe 1989; Hoem 1995).
Divorce levels are also higher at lower levels of socio-economic status. A lower income
means that the instrumental exchanges in the marriage are less rewarding and
consequently the prospect of divorce is not as negative. In Sweden, the relationship
between education and the propensity to divorce has changed (Hoem 1995). In cohorts
born before 1940, those with more education were more likely to divorce, possibly
because of more liberal attitudes toward divorce. However, in subsequent cohorts those
with more education have lower divorce probabilities, possibly because of the more
rewarding nature of their instrumental exchanges. In Canada, Balakrishnan and his
colleagues (1993) found that higher education is linked with higher divorce rates, but the
presence of children reduces these rates. Higher men's incomes reduce divorce. Women
with higher incomes have higher divorce prospects, but lower rates of dissolution of
cohabitation. Divorce propensities are particularly high for those who married at a young
age and who had premarital births.
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The greater relevance of the expressive dimension is equally important in understanding
the divorce trend. Marriage is now seen much more as an arrangement for the mutual
fulfilment of participants. Spouses expect more from families in terms of intimacy and
interpersonal affect. In addition, individual well-being and self-fulfilment are seen as
significant values. Families are expected to serve individual needs, rather than individuals
serving family needs. Divorce today then may be more prevalent because it represents a
natural solution to marriages that do not serve the mutual fulfilment of the spouses. In
particular, 88 to 95 percent of respondents consider that divorce is justified if there is
"lack of love and respect from the partner," "unfaithful behaviour" or "abusive
behaviour" (Frederick and Hamel 1998, p. 8). According to the 1995 General Social
Survey, the most common grounds for divorce are abusive behaviour, infidelity, lack of
love and respect, and excessive drinking by a partner, all factors at the expressive level.
For Hareven (1983), high rates of divorce were proof that people care about marriage,
and about the quality of their relationships. On the other hand, Ambert and Baker (1988)
found that significant numbers regret their decision to divorce. In a third of separations,
there were no serious grounds for divorce. Some divorces happen because of
circumstances that have little to do with the marriage, such as problems at work, mid-life
crises or continuing emotional problems. Other divorces are due to "taking a risk" with an
affair that does not lead to a permanent relationship.
One of the most consistent findings in divorce research is that the probabilities of divorce
are higher for those getting married at an early age. For women aged 35 to 49 in 1984, the
probability of marital dissolution among those who married at 19 years of age or younger
was almost twice as large (26 versus 14 percent) as the probability among those who
married at the age of 25 or older (Balakrishnan and Grindstaff 1988; Desrosiers and Le
Bourdais 1991). The same applies to the risk of dissolution of common-law unions,
which are higher for those entering unions at young ages or if there was a conception
before the union (Turcotte and Bélanger 1997, pp. 19-20). There are several reasons for
the higher divorce levels among those marrying young. Some of these reasons are related
to instrumental questions. The lower income associated with youth means the
instrumental exchanges may be less rewarding. Regarding the expressive dimension, one
can hypothesize that, as these young married persons mature, they find their spouses to
have been poor choices and they do not receive the expected gratification. It may even be
that, for persons marrying at younger ages, emotional gratification is particularly
important. Early marriage may have been a way of escaping an unrewarding situation in
their families of origin. If the expressive dimension is especially important to them, they
will hesitate less to separate when this dimension is not working.
The higher incidence of divorce for second marriages can also be seen in this light. The
lowest dissolution rate is for marriages involving two single people, while those
involving a divorced woman and a single man or two divorced persons have the highest
rates (Dumas 1990, p. 44). Persons who have already divorced are more likely to see
marriage in terms of mutual fulfilment and to leave a marriage that is not rewarding.
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Obviously, divorce would be less common if everyone frowned on it and if the legal
restrictions were formidable. But there has been a significant change in the attitudes
toward divorce in Western societies. The social stigma attached to marital dissolution has
lessened considerably and people now accept that divorce occurs frequently for "normal"
people. There has also been considerable change in the definition of acceptable grounds
for divorce. Until 1968, adultery was the only grounds for divorce in Canada. The 1968
Divorce Act extended the grounds for divorce to include both fault-related grounds and
marriage-breakdown grounds. Fault-related grounds include adultery and other sexual
offences, prolonged alcohol or drug addiction, and physical and mental cruelty. To obtain
a divorce on these grounds there must be an injured party who brings the other spouse to
trial and a determination of guilt. As of 1986, divorce under marriage-breakdown grounds
can occur after spouses have lived apart for one year, for whatever reason.
Lack of agreement on the model for the division of earning and caring may also be
responsible for separations, especially in cases where there is difficulty accommodating
new models. In other cases the division of work is seen as significantly unjust. The
inability of couples to work out acceptable arrangements on the sharing of work can
represent a major element of incompatibility. It could also be that persons who are not
willing to do their share have already indicated that they do not care about the
relationship. Stated positively, persons who care about each other will seek to establish
relationships based on a sense of overall equity.
In American couples, Huber and Spitze (1983) found that over a fifth of men and close to
a third of women had seriously thought of divorce. Earnings had no effect on the
likelihood of having considered divorce, but the more housework the husband was seen
to do, the less likely the wife was to have thought of divorce.
But sharing tasks can also be difficult since it involves the potential to criticize each other
and to enter the wife's domain. Thompson and Walker (1989, p. 859) found that "sharing
family work is associated with greater marital strain." (The link between household
division of labour and family solidarity was dealt with by Emile Durkheim in his Division
of Labour. For a more recent formulation, see Burch 1985).
Consequences of Union Dissolution
Apart from the effect on children, union dissolution impacts on the couples themselves.
Interesting analyses have been made of the economic outcomes of separation, for men
and women. Administrative data, especially from taxation files, have enabled a five-year
follow-up for persons who separated between 1987 and 1993 (Galarneau and Sturrock
1997; Galarneau 1998). Distinct analyses were done for the 40 percent who did not have
children under 18 living at home, and the 60 percent who did have children. In the case of
those without children, the adjusted family income (after tax and after adjustment for
support payments and receipts) declined significantly for women in the first year (by 16
percent) but after five years it involved a five percent decline for women and a two
percent gain for men. After five years, 51 percent of men and 47 percent of women had
gained in adjusted family income, compared to the year of separation. Those who had
remarried or entered cohabitation and were living as couples after five years were more
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likely to have made gains. However, women were less likely to have formed a new
partnership. For persons who had children under 18, there were even more significant
declines in income for women in the first year (23 percent) but after five years the decline
was five percent for women compared to a 15 percent gain for men. Once again, there
were more gains for those who formed couples.
Models of Sharing Earning and Caring
Since earning and caring activities represent the major responsibilities of families, it is
useful to consider alternate models through which paid and unpaid work are divided.
Paid Work by Gender and Parental Status
Men’s employment/population ratios have declined since 1981 and women’s have
increased since 1971. Among the OECD countries, Canada is exceptional for the amount
of change between 1960 and 1990 (Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004, p. 38). In 1960, with
32 percent of women in the labour force, Canada was among the countries with the
lowest participation; in 2000, the rate of 71 percent puts Canada in the group with the
highest participation.
While the trends for women and men are converging, parenthood still has the opposite
average effects; that is, it leads to divergence of the employment patterns of women and
men. Women with children at home are less likely to work full time, and the younger the
child the less likely they are to be working full time. The opposite occurs for men who
are more likely to work full time if they have children at home. There are similar findings
with regard to work interruptions, which are more likely for women when they have
children, but less likely for men who have children (Cook and Beaujot 1996).
When the relationships are analyzed by marital status, women with children at home are
more likely to work full time when they are in cohabiting union or in post-union status,
and least likely when they have never married (see Table 3). For men with children at
home, it is the married who are most likely to be working full time, but again the never
married are least likely to work full time, and least likely to be employed. While 73.1
percent of all women with children under 6 are working, with 49.7 percent working full
time, the differences by marital status imply that the traditional division of work is more
likely to occur for married women than for women in cohabiting unions or in post-union
status. Nonetheless, the least amount of market work occurs for the never married, where
38.5 percent of women with children under 6 are not employed. The differences are
stronger when the children are aged 0 to 3 years. In this case, in 2002, 46.7 percent of
mothers in single-parent families were working compared to 64.1 percent in two-parent
families (Neill 2004, p. 6).
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Table 3: Proportion (%) Working Full Time, Part Time and Not
Employed by Sex, Presence of Children, Marital Status, Canada, 2001
Male

Female

FullTime

PartTime

Not
Employed

FullTime

PartTime

Not
Employed

Married
No child under 25
Children under 6
Youngest child 6-14
Youngest child 15-24
Total

73.5
92.0
91.3
87.3
84.4

7.2
3.3
3.5
4.3
4.9

19.2
4.7
5.2
8.4
10.7

49.2
49.7
57.1
60.8
53.3

16.4
24.9
24.9
19.0
20.6

34.3
25.4
17.9
20.2
26.1

Common-law
No child under 25
Children under 6
Youngest child 6-14
Youngest child 15-24
Total

83.0
87.2
86.9
86.3
84.8

7.4
5.7
5.0
5.0
6.5

9.6
7.2
8.0
8.7
8.7

69.7
54.0
65.0
73.5
65.5

16.8
20.4
18.4
13.7
17.7

13.5
25.6
16.6
12.7
16.8

Divorced/separated/widowed
No child under 25
69.8
Children under 6
84.5
Youngest child 6-14
84.1
Youngest child 15-24
83.7
Total
72.6

7.6
4.1
5.9
4.8
7.1

22.6
11.4
10.0
11.5
20.3

51.1
53.4
63.7
67.8
56.5

13.7
18.4
18.6
13.5
14.9

35.2
28.2
17.7
18.7
28.6

Never married
No child under 25
Children under 6
Youngest child 6-14
Youngest child 15-24
Total

54.5
64.9
73.9
72.6
54.7

24.0
13.5
7.8
5.2
23.8

21.5
21.6
18.3
22.2
21.5

44.4
40.8
58.6
65.1
45.0

33.1
20.8
16.2
12.9
31.4

22.6
38.5
25.2
21.9
23.6

Total
No child under 25
Children under 6
Youngest child 6-14
Youngest child 15-24
Total

62.0
90.5
90.2
86.9
72.4

16.4
4.0
3.8
4.4
11.7

21.6
5.5
6.0
8.7
15.9

48.0
49.7
58.9
62.8
51.9

23.0
23.4
22.8
17.6
22.4

28.9
26.9
18.2
19.5
25.7

Source: Canada 2001 Census Public Use Sample.

These relationships of work and parenting indicate the persistence of certain elements of
the complementary roles of the family division of labour. In an American study, for
example, the average tendency was for childbirth to reduce women’s work time and to
increase men’s average wage (Lundberg and Rose 1998). Couples in which wives
interrupted their careers for child rearing showed increased task specialization associated
with childbirth, including a reallocation of time of both husband and wife, and declines in
wages of wives. However, there is also evidence of the emergence of other patterns. This
same study showed that the patterns are significantly different for couples in which the
wife participated continuously in the labour market. In those cases, the mother’s wage
rate did not decline while the hours worked by fathers declined by more than seven
percent after the birth of the first child. Furthermore, the wage differentiation on the birth
of a first child was not as significant for younger cohorts. Thus, the increase in task
specialization associated with childbirth was less applicable to younger cohorts and to the
sub-sample of couples in which wives continuously participated in the labour force. As
the model of continuous participation in the labour force becomes dominant, the authors
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see converging time-use patterns for husbands and wives and a declining wage
differentiation associated with parenthood.
The dynamics will be rather different in families based on complementary roles, as
compared to what some have called “new families” based on a two-worker model with a
more symmetrical division of paid and unpaid work. Berk (1985) used the concept of
families as a gender factory to highlight the way the division of labour in households
promoted gender differentiation. However, some “new men” have come to see the value
of productive roles for both women and men, of maintaining relationships based on
equality, and of sharing in unpaid work as a form of mutuality (Coltrane 1995). Just as
families have come to promote the education of both their daughters and sons (Wanner
1999), some couples have come to aspire to post-gender marriages where the division of
work, still valuable in terms of efficiency, is not based on gender.
When paid work and family care were each full-time jobs, then having one person in the
market and one at home brought efficiency. However, when both are to be in the market,
Becker (1981) proposed that efficiency would necessitate that at most one person would
divide her/his time between home and market production. This theoretical assumption is
under question when maximizing production requires that neither worker be shackled
with an excessive burden at home. Besides, maximizing efficiency is not necessarily the
overriding consideration, in comparison to emphasizing things like equality and
mutuality. While there is certain efficiency to the complementary-roles model of
marriage, it is also a high-risk alternative for women and children, since it lacks insurance
against the loss of the breadwinner.
Types of Sharing Paid and Unpaid Work
Time use data provide an opportunity for detailed descriptions of the different family
models. On the basis of the 1998 time-use survey, we divided couples into categories
relating to the division of productive activities (Beaujot and Liu 2005; Beaujot and
Ravanera 2003). The advantage of time use is that it adopts the same unit of measurement
of earning and caring activities, that is, the time spent in these activities. Compared to the
wife, the husband could be doing more paid work, less paid work or the same amount of
paid work. Similarly, the husband could be doing more, less, or the same amount of
unpaid work. We define “same amount” as the case where each member of the couple
reports spending between 45 percent and 55 percent of the total time spent by the couple.
A simplification of the categories shows that the complementary-traditional (he does
more paid work, she does more unpaid work) is the predominant model with 48.5
percent, followed by woman’s double burden (she is doing same amount of or more paid
work, and more unpaid work) with 22.9 percent. But there are those who follow the
reverse models as well; that is, the complementary-gender-reversed (she does more paid
work, he does more unpaid work) comprises 5.3 percent, and the man’s double burden
(he is doing same amount of or more paid work, and more unpaid work), 10.0 percent.
The role-sharing model, they do the same amount of unpaid work, comprises 13.1
percent. Risman and Johnson-Sumerford (1998) called this role-sharing model a postgender marriage. For the most part, their qualitative studies, along with those by
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Hochschild (1989), have seen the role-sharing model as a deliberate attempt by couples to
achieve a more egalitarian relationship.
The complementary-traditional pattern is more common when there are younger children
and when there are more children in the home (Beaujot and Ravanera 2003). However,
women’s double burden is most common when there are no children, or when children
are older. Men’s double burden is also more common when there are no children. The
role-sharing model is most common, amounting to 18.5 percent, when both are working
full time, or when there are two children (15.1 percent).
Late Adulthood (troisième age, 60-79, quatrième age, 80 plus )
Productivity of the Elderly
In Reforms for an Ageing Society, the OECD (2000) observed a dramatic fall in the
number of expected years of life spent in employment, along with growth in the years
spent in school and retirement. Since the 1960s, the percentage of the population at work
has been growing: there are fewer children, the baby boom is in the labour force, and
women’s participation has increased. For Canada, the percentage of the population
employed is expected to continue increasing until 2010, but then to decline if there is a
continuation of present trends in participation by age. The continuation of current trends
to the year 2030 would mean that Canadian men would spend 50 percent of their lives
employed, compared to 74 percent under 1960 conditions (OECD 2000, p. 141; Hicks
2003).
This OECD (2000) document argued in particular for changes that would promote the
employment of older workers. It suggested reforms to public pension systems, taxation
systems and social transfer programs to remove incentives to early retirement. For
pensions themselves, the document proposed a better mix with more private plans,
phased reductions in public pension benefits and hikes in contribution rates. International
comparisons suggest that early retirement is at least partly due to incentives built into
retirement policies (Gruber and Wise 1997). That is, retirement is earlier when the
minimum age for entitlement to pension benefits is lower, when the value of pensions is
higher, when there are fewer pension benefits from additional years of work, and when
disability pensions are available below the normal retirement age.
At the same time, there is much variability in people’s health and potential in their 60s
and 70s. Some are able to maintain a high level of productivity; others suffer from
lowered potential, chronic conditions and disability. While some can continue at the same
pace of productivity, many should be carrying fewer responsibilities. Instead of
encouraging retirement, there may be ways to encourage a change in occupation. Instead
of being teachers, professors or day care workers, could persons who are past their prime
ages of productivity not be assistants? Rather than being managers, could they be
administrative assistants? For others, it may be possible to reduce hours at work,
encouraging more time spent volunteering or caring for family members.
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That is, in an economy based on high skills, productivity in the later years could be rather
different from earlier productivity; it could be devoted more to caring, both paid and
unpaid, in the family and beyond the family. This would partly relieve young parents,
who would be better able to balance their family and work lives. It might even encourage
more people to become parents, knowing that there is more support, both formal and
informal.
The above discussion of the productivity of older persons is concerned with changes in
the extent of paid work in the provision of goods or services. It does not imply that older
people are dependent or a drag on society and the economy. Many already provide
unpaid services to family and community. Many, if not most, elderly pay property and
income taxes on their pensions and investment income, if they have any. And they
continue to consume, thus paying the goods and services tax and provincial sales tax
(where applicable). The comparison of old-age dependency and that of young children
(as in the frequently used dependency ratio) needs to be revisited.
Aging of the Boomers: Possible Patterns at Later Life
Another way of viewing the interplay between productivity and reproduction at later life
is through a life-course lens. There are signs that the trend toward early retirement and
decreasing labour force participation among the elderly, which started as early as the
mid-1940s (McDonald and Chen 1994), is beginning to change. As can be seen in Figure
7, the average ages at retirement of men and women reached their lowest points in 1998
and since then, the retirement ages seem to be on the rise. The employment rate at ages
55+ increased from 24.6 to 29.5 between 2000 and 2004 (Perspectives on Labour and
Income 2005, p. 54). As Manon (1996) noted, however, the pathways to retirement are
becoming more diversified with an increasing proportion of retirement occurring before
or after the mandatory retirement age of 65, and with a substantial number of retirees
returning to paid work after initial retirement.

Figure 7: Average Age at Retirement, 1976-2004, Men and Women,
Canada
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As the baby-boom generation (born between roughly 1945 and 1965) enters into
retirement, the timing of and trajectories to retirement will most likely deviate from the
patterns set by the older cohorts. As Ravanera and Rajulton (2002) noted, the boomers
have pioneered in the spread of cohabitation, set the trend toward older age at first
marriage and at first birth, experienced higher divorce rates and exhibited greater
variations in the timing of these transitions, all of which point to the boomers’ propensity
to deviate from age norms and life-course patterns. Their lower fertility could also make
a difference in later life, as they will have fewer family members (children and
grandchildren, nieces and nephews) with whom to spend their leisure days. It would not
be surprising, therefore, if the baby boomers lead a lifestyle at later life different from
that of previous cohorts. The deviation could come in later disengagement from the
labour force, but also in different means of economic inclusion, such as through afterretirement careers, return to colleges and universities, part-time work or other novel work
arrangements (Ravanera and Rajulton 2002).
The elderly of the future will be more highly educated, and they may be in better health
and might live longer than current elderly persons. But while higher education and good
health are necessary for the extension of economic inclusion at later life, they are not
sufficient conditions (Ravanera and Rajulton 2002). Other factors could bring about a
longer stay in the work force, among which are the coming labour shortage resulting
from smaller cohorts following the baby-boom generation and the changing nature of
work, mainly through changes in industrial and occupational structures (McDonald and
Chen 1994; Foot and Gibson 1994; and Manon 1996). But, these would probably still be
insufficient. Employers and the government may need to make changes such as those
cited by the OECD to attract the elderly to stay longer in the labour force.
Ideally, such policies will be to not compromise the employment prospects of younger
people. While employment is not in general a zero-sum game among the generations, it
often is the case that the retirement of the older person makes possible the employment or
advancement of the younger.
The Fourth Age
The demarcation between the third and fourth age cannot be made precisely, since it
depends more on health than age as such. Not only do we live longer, but part of this
longer life involves more years of poor health. At the same time, a shorter period of
employment may mean less savings and smaller pension entitlements. And so, many very
old persons face growing problems of sickness and disability and dwindling economic
resources.
Martel and Bélanger (1999) found that health-adjusted life expectancy increased over the
period 1986-1996. They estimated that at age 65 the average person has a dependencefree life expectancy of 13 years, that is, to age 78. Lachapelle and Stone (2001) proposed
that the fourth age be defined through activity limitations, more or less serious
dependency and loss of the state of good health. They proposed that this threshold
changed from an average age of 74 years in 1951 to 78 years in 1996. Another possibility
would be to use age 80 as a demarcation; under current conditions that would mean
persons living longer than the average life expectancy at birth.
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Using the measure based on health, Lachapelle and Stone (2001) estimated that two
percent of the Canadian population was in this fourth age in 1951, compared to 2.7
percent in 2001. It is expected to rise to six percent in 2051. Using a measure based
solely on age, the percent of the population aged 80 and over increased from one percent
in 1951 to three percent in 2001; but it will reach over eight percent by 2051.
Rather than calculating this stage through years since birth, it might be measured from
the other end of life. There comes a time when life needs to be calculated not from the
beginning, but from the end, as people do when they plan for retirement. Disability and
chronic conditions call for less involvement in production, but persons at these ages are
not necessarily dependent. Some remain able to care for others, in their family and
beyond. The purpose should be to downplay ideas like “freedom 55” or retirement at age
65, and to establish more flexibility over the life course. Freud held that the keys to
human fulfilment were love and work (but not necessarily paid work). This is as true in
the third and fourth ages as any other.
Caring of and for the Elderly
In an extensive review of the literature on population aging, Ulysse (1997) concluded that
the family “represents one of the ‘circuits’, if not the primary circuit through which
intergenerational solidarity is structured, based on a range of gifts and exchanges (goods,
time, services, money) which circulate in both a descendant and ascendant pattern” (p.
51). Further, he noted that the elderly are often taken care of by their family, despite the
presence of public and institutional care facilities, and that middle-aged women play a
key role.
In an analysis of the 1996 General Social Survey on Social and Community support,
Rajulton and Ravanera (2006) showed a similar finding. In spite of the dramatic changes
taking place in the family, the family support system still works in Canada. Canadians are
involved in all types of support, the most common being the functional type; that is, more
than 80 percent give and receive tangible help. Women generally give and receive more
help for personal care and provide more help for child care. However, this study showed
that men are involved in the support system as well and are particularly more involved in
things that do not involve personal care, such as financial management, and in arranging
for and co-ordinating formal services. As regards the elderly, the same study found that,
irrespective of their income, the elderly are involved in different forms of support, the
largest involvement falling into the functional type; that is, they give or receive various
types of help. At the same time, there is not necessarily a sharp distinction between
affective and functional since caring for someone’s needs is often done out of affection
and with affection.
Caregiving of various kinds continues to be a great part of women’s tasks (Fast et al.
2004). There are signs, however, that women may no longer be as inclined as in the past
to continue this role. In a comparison of two cohorts (1910-1919 and 1920-29) of women,
for example, Hareven (2000, pp.145-147) found that the younger cohort, though
expressing similar values, felt less inclined or less able to do the caring. She proposed
that this reflects an increasing individualization in family relationships and reliance on
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public agencies and institutions to take on the responsibilities for elderly care. BeckGernsheim (2002, pp. 64-85) came to the same conclusion: in both child and elderly care,
she foresaw a huge gap in the supply of caregivers as women increasingly adopt values of
freedom and equality and take on paying jobs for their own security.
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5. Policy Issues
As already indicated, research on caring, earning and learning over the life course raises a
number of policy issues. There are general questions, such as the role of government in
setting the right conditions for families to exist and thrive. And there are specific
questions relating to such things as parental leave, child care and child tax benefits.
Questions of caring, earning and learning relate to the agenda on exclusion and inclusion,
they relate to social capacity in terms of families being part of Canada’s social
foundations, and they relate to the role of caregivers, for both children and the elderly. In
each case, questions may be raised regarding the respective roles of government, market,
community, workplace and family in individual welfare. How does one support families
that are so different, especially vulnerable families, those who have disabilities or
difficulties in terms of earning, learning and caring? We make the case that all families
need the security of supportive policies and a supportive society, but there are also real
differences based on such things as number and timing of children, and available
resources.
Broadly speaking, it is useful to consider three ways of handling risks: individual selfsufficiency, family support and a social safety net. A central question is the sharing
between families and the state in the care of people who are dependent because of age,
disability or health. In part, the state seeks to encourage family support of dependants and
to encourage self-reliance. But there are contradictions: persons who look after family
dependants will be less self-sufficient in the labour market. Given the three bases for
support — individual, family, society — and a fourth, community, added by Jane Jenson
(2004b), the state needs to assist individuals and families in ways that also maximize selfreliance.
In her extensive review of Canadian family policies, Baker (1995) considered three areas:
laws relating to marriage, divorce, reproduction, adoption, custody and child support;
support of family income through tax provisions, child benefits and leave benefits; and
direct services, such as child care, child protection, home-care health services and
subsidized housing. Beaujot (2000, pp. 331-351) discussed policies that relate to earning
and work (employment, work incentives, workplace benefits, parental leave, part-time
work, work-life balance) and to caring (child benefits, welfare provisions for children,
child care).
Contrasting orientations to family policy across societies, Gauthier (1996) compared a
traditional model to an egalitarian model, then introduced a third model defined as “profamily but non-interventionist” where interventions are limited and targeted only to
families in need. Jenson (2004a) spoke of paradigms defined by either family
responsibility or societal investment in children.
Beaujot (2000, pp. 351-356) made a case for policies that push toward a gender balance
of earning and caring. As we opt for a society where there are fewer inter-spousal
dependencies, and more equality between men and women, it is useful to take note of
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continuing legal provisions based on a traditional breadwinner model. This may apply to
widowhood benefits, pension splitting and tax deductions for a dependent spouse. While
these provisions are a means of accommodating dependency in couples, they can also
discourage rather than promote the economic independence of women and men.
Similarly, poorly subsidized parental leave and the lack of benefits for part-time work can
reduce the likelihood that couples will share the leaves and part-time work associated
with childbearing, as they seek to maximize the family income. In divorce, making joint
custody the default condition would signal the continuing responsibility of both parents
for the well-being of children. Joint custody would also signal that separations may sever
the link between adults, but not those between adults and children.
Specific Policy Issues
The following sections present a brief discussion of a few specific issues: balancing work
and family life, supporting lone parents, intergenerational equity and the role of the
private sector. We then discuss in greater detail two related topics of particular interest to
the authors: low fertility and pronatalist policy.
Balancing Work and Family Life
If we look at gender and family change through both economic and cultural lenses, there
seems to be an interest in both more equal opportunities at work and in increased parental
time with children. Most would seem to prefer an Aadaptive@ model, described by Hakim
(2003), that is neither work-centred nor family-centred but that allows for both family
and work. Both work and care are time-intensive activities, and there are concerns
regarding time deficits and for both work and family activities.
In terms of parental leave in Canada, there has been an increase in the average months of
leave as the benefits of Employment Insurance have been extended to one year from the
previous benefit of six months (Marshall 2003). In 1993-96, for example, 60 percent
returned within six months and 86 percent within a year, whereas in 2001 only 24 percent
returned within six months but 77 percent within a year (Marshall 1999, 2003). A twotiered system has evolved, with some having only access to the Employment Insurance
benefit, and others having considerable top-up from employers. In support of families, a
call for a universal system of parental leave with 75 percent of regular pay seems
appropriate.
Canada is unique in having no universal benefit for children, either as a family allowance
or as a tax deduction. The earlier benefits along these lines were converted into the child
tax benefit, which is based on income. A case could be made for enriching the child tax
benefit and extending it to middle-class persons with children. This would help toward
equalizing their standard of living compared to people without children, in recognition of
their child-rearing contribution to the wider society. These types of benefits allow parents
to spend less of their time in the market and more time with their young children.
For mothers with children under 6 years of age, there is also considerable interest in
reduced hours of work, as long as these reduced hours could come with good benefits.
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Employers take advantage of part-time workers, in part because they are allowed to
discriminate in terms of salary and work benefits. It would appear that the greater
opportunity for part-time work in Northern as compared to Southern Europe is part of the
reason for higher fertility in Northern Europe.
Clearly, child-care services need to be part of this picture. The differences between
Quebec and the rest of Canada indicate that services will be used if they are provided at a
reasonable cost. Jenson (2004a) proposed that a paradigm shift is occurring, from the
view that children are the responsibility of the parents, to an “investing-in-children”
perspective. In the earlier paradigm, families have primary responsibility and the state
takes over when the parents are unable to do so. In the social investment paradigm, there
are financial inducements to use high quality non-parental child care. Jenson proposed
that the two paradigms currently co-exist, thus the differential views. Some opt for
stronger state involvement in early childhood education and child care. Others are more
interested in alternatives that would enable parents to look after children themselves,
through enriched parental leaves, part-time work with good benefits and direct transfers
to parents.
Support for Lone Parents
We also need to enhance our special provisions for lone parents (Beaujot and Liu 2002).
Two provisions benefit lone parents. One is the equivalent-to-married tax deduction that
is granted on behalf of the first child of a lone parent, just as one would claim a tax
deduction based on having a dependent spouse. Another is the 75 percent replacement
rate for Employment Insurance in the case of a main breadwinner who has low income
and is receiving child tax benefits. These provisions are small in comparison to those of
some other countries. For instance, Denmark doubles the family allowance for the first
child of a lone-parent family. Other Canadian provisions involve capturing income from
the absent parent. While this is clearly important, it does not help if the absent parent is
unable to pay or manages to escape making the child support payments. Advance
maintenance payments provide a stronger guarantee since they are provided directly by
the state to the lone parent, regardless of the extent to which they can be recaptured from
the absent parent.
Intergenerational Equity
The discussion in the previous section raises issues of generational equity. A case can be
made that, despite their smaller numbers, young adults are not faring so well as previous
generations. Costs of higher education, for example, have risen appreciably. Greater
societal investments in post-secondary education would allow young people to leave
home sooner, and to finish their education more efficiently without the distraction of parttime jobs. Greater investments in the school-to-work transition, especially for the benefit
of those who leave school early, would reduce the uncertainties of the initial years on the
labour market. Stronger investments in young families, including subsidies for parental
leaves, tax benefits, reduced work hours and child care, would enable people in this stage
of life to achieve their work and family goals. Such subsidies would be based on unique
ways in which the human life course has evolved, with a long life expectancy, and long
youth dependency subsidized by a long period of post-reproductive productivity.
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Sometimes, this productivity in the troisième age can occur through direct care of
grandchildren, as was the historical case. At other times, it can occur through extending
the regular work life, or it can occur through volunteer work or new careers with reduced
responsibility.
These are difficult questions, in part because an aging society tends to think especially of
ways in which the lives of older people can be improved, and we tend to ignore the needs
of the young who are less numerous and have limited political voice. For instance, in the
countries with greater employment protection, which benefits workers who have more
seniority, there tend to be higher relative levels of youth unemployment (Breen
and Buchmann 2002). As there are now smaller relative numbers of people at young
adult ages, it is important to recognize that investments in the early stages of the life
course provide the best basis for long-term security.
One consideration in the realm of inter-generation transfer is housing. We pay high costs
for household privacy and our strong tendency toward separate living. One barrier to
more forms of joint living (with older children, parents, grandparents and other relatives)
is the existence of strong single-residential zoning laws which discourage the creation of
semi-autonomous living units within a larger household (e.g., granny flats or separate
quarters for young adults). More flexibility in this regard might be useful, given the large
number of lone parents and isolated elderly. A different way of looking at it is to
distinguish two types of co-residence: living in the same housing unit (same kitchen,
entry, etc.) or living in separate housing units as so defined within the same structure. The
latter can yield a large measure of privacy and autonomy, while providing economies of
joint living (e.g., one furnace etc.).
The Role of the Private Sector
At the individual level, income security — or the lack thereof — is partly a result of the
individual's own efforts (past and present), and partly a result of the total socio-economic
context. This context consists of policies and programs of various levels of government,
but also the policies and programs of the private sector, as these relate to employment,
wages and benefits. Increasingly, the context includes global economic conditions. In
other words, the context of individual or family income security is a complex system.
Attempts to promote the well-being of Canadian individuals and families, therefore, must
take account of the whole system if they are to be effective, and discussions of the issues
must include the systemic effects of the private sector (see Box 3).
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Box 3: The Elephant in the Room: The Private Sector and Income
Security
In Knowledge Plan, 2005-2008, there are references to market forces (e.g., p.12). But these tend to be
described in neutral or even positive terms, and treated as more or less inevitable. There is little
consideration given to the fact that many aspects of the current labour market are the outcomes of
systematic and deliberate actions on the part of employers.
In the TD Bank report (2005b) cited earlier, there is clearer recognition of the serious erosion of the job
market facing Canadians, such that “working is no guarantee of an adequate standard of living in Canada”
(p. 26).
“The reasons range from the stagnant growth in real median wages recorded over the
last two decades, to a decline in the quality of employment, with temporary and nonstandard work on the rise, and non-wage benefits, like participation in employee health
insurance and registered pension plans, on the wane…. [T]he phenomenon of working
poverty, particularly among those working full-time, is troubling (p. 26).
Given this report’s title and main focus, it is understandable that it goes on to consider primarily
government policies and programs that affect income security – social assistance, CPP, OAS, income
taxes, etc. But, given a recognition that the private sector is partly to blame for the situation they find
“troubling,” it is surprising that nowhere is it suggested that the private sector might modify some of its
policies to help alleviate the problem. Nor is it suggested in either report that governments might put
pressure on the private sector to do so, through incentives or disincentives.
There is irony in the fact that “job creation” is the chief justification for various federal government
programs providing subsidies to large corporations (including tax relief), whereas cutting jobs and
downgrading their quality and security is perhaps the leading management tool for “cost-cutting” and
“restructuring.”
As the TD Bank report rightly notes, government income security programs were never intended to be a
substitute for work, except temporarily or for those unable to work. But, given current labour market
conditions, as characterized above, either government programs must pick up the slack for more and more
working Canadians, or there will be further stagnation or erosion.
A healthy economy does not in itself assure economic well-being for the average Canadian worker. In
another recent report from TD Bank (2005a), it is noted that over the last fifteen years, real GDP per
Canadian has risen 25.5 percent, while real after-tax income has risen only 3.6 percent, this despite the
fact that the labour force was becoming better educated and older (more experienced). Clearly, prosperity
is not being shared.
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Box 3 (cont’d): The Elephant in the Room: The Private Sector and Income Security
Is it the role of government to fix problems caused in part by private sector policies?
Governments also should take care that their various programs do not work at cross-purposes. David
Foot (2005) has recently questioned the timing of federal government plans to increase immigration on
the grounds that it could work against the integration of children of baby-boomers, native-born
Canadians, into the labour market. What is the point of creating even more competition among young
workers (since immigrants also typically are in their 20's and 30's)? In short, is Manpower and
Immigration working at cross-purposes to HRSDC?
Thomas K. Burch

Low Fertility
Fertility is lower than in the past partly because of the delays in family formation and the
higher proportions of people who are not living in married or cohabiting relationships.
The delays in early life transitions, including first childbirth, reduce the likelihood that
people will have their desired number of children. The United Nations (1994, p. 30)
promoted “the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and responsibly
the number, spacing and timing of their children.” In countries with low fertility, do
young people have the effective freedom to have the children that they desire? Several
European countries, France in particular, have begun to ask whether the social and
economic policies make this possible. Relevant issues include the availability of housing,
career entry questions, work-life balance issues (including leaves), part-time work and
child care, and subsidies for some of the basic costs of children.
Fertility needs to be related to determinants at the individual, family and societal levels,
and gender needs to be a significant part of discussions on childbearing. LapierreAdamcyk and Lussier (2003, p. 100) observed succinctly that redefining the role of
women to include that of producer in the workplace, in addition to being a wife and
mother, changes the value of a child and the range of possibilities for contributing to
society. The significant differences in the timing of first births between women in
teaching as compared to business or law suggest that occupations provide different
amounts of flexibility to accommodate family roles (Ranson 1998). It may also be that
there are different orientations among women: family-centred women will have children
in any case, career-centred women will have few if any children, and dual-role women
will have children if the circumstances are favourable; the latter are more likely to be
responsive to “women-friendly” policies (Esping-Anderson 2001, pp. 52-53; Hakim
2003).
Several topics regarding reproduction need to be related to questions of economic
production and the changing nature of work. To what extent is the postponement of
fertility due to difficulty in finding a decent job? To what extent are difficulties in
balancing work and family linked to low fertility? Would the creation of more familyfriendly policies in the work world lead to a rise in fertility? Would greater equality
between men and women lead to higher fertility? Does a more equitable sharing of
household tasks lead to a fertility rate closer to replacement? For instance, McDonald
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(2000) proposed that fertility is particularly low when there is more gender equity in the
broader society than in families. Using data from the United States, Torr and Short (2004)
found a u-shaped relationship; both the most modern and the most traditional housework
arrangements are positively related to the likelihood of a second birth.
When considering the potential effects of policy, comparisons across societies and over
time are particularly important (Gauthier 1996). After considering the policy context of
fertility in five countries (France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Sweden), Grant et al.
(2004) proposed that government policies can slow declines in fertility rates, but that no
single policy works, and the effects take place slowly. This Rand publication also
proposed that “policies indirectly aimed at fertility which target improvements in broader
conditions may have beneficial fertility effects” (Grant et al., p. xiv). In a broad ethical
context, Henripin (1989, p. 123) proposed that true individual freedom occurs when the
state both supports contraception and has policies favouring fertility, commenting that in
matters of procreation, a really free society makes it possible for its members to have
children if they wish to and not to have children if they don’t want to do so. A pro-family
policy would probably include fiscal structures that take into account the number of
dependent children when taxation is used to redistribute across families and individuals.
In comparing the United States and Canada, Torrey and Eberstadt (2005) observed that
the higher levels of childbearing in the United States are partly a function of higher rates
at young ages; they are also consistent with a younger age at first marriage, less
cohabitation, lower unemployment and higher average incomes in the United States. At
the same time, Canada’s more supportive social policies do not translate into higher
fertility.
Making comparisons across 13 European countries, Adsera (2005) found more
postponement of childbearing where there is more restrictive employment protection
legislation, typically favouring older workers, and where there is more economic
uncertainty in the form of persistent unemployment. Adsera also found that first births
occur sooner where there is strong availability of secure employment through the state.
Transitions to second and third births are facilitated by a greater availability of part-time
work and more generous maternity benefits. Bringing the United States into the
comparison suggests that childbearing may be higher in the context of either a welfare
state that works in terms of the interests of young families or a neo-liberal economy that
works in terms of employment security (Adsera 2004).
The case of Sweden in the late 1980s and early 1990s suggests that a reduction in state
support for families can especially undermine childbearing (Hoem and Hoem 1996).
Once there was more confidence in the state’s support, fertility returned to somewhat
higher levels. The strong subsidies in France can also be linked to higher childbearing.
This gives young couples a sense of being supported by the broader society. In the United
States, the low unemployment rates and the availability of employment have given young
people the confidence that they can find a job following a period of unpaid leave after
childbirth. It may be that Canada has neither the strong family-supportive policies of
certain European countries, nor the neo-liberal economy that is providing security to
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young people as in the United States. Canada’s welfare state is especially oriented toward
the elderly, rather than to young families. For instance, among the eight countries
compared, the social expenditure on non-elderly as a percent of GDP is second lowest in
Canada, while the prevalence of low-income in families with children is second highest
(as shown in Table 4), both for two-parent and one-parent families (Picot and Myles
2005, pp. 6, 10). In contrast, among these eight countries, the prevalence of low income
among Canadian elderly is second lowest.

Table 4: Poverty Rates (% of population poor1) in Eight Rich
Countries, by Age Group, at the Turn of the Century
Nation (year)
United States (00)
United Kingdom (99)
Canada (97)
Netherlands (99)
Germany (00)
Belgium (97)
Sweden (00)
Finland (00)
Overall Average

Overall2
17.0
12.3
11.9
8.9
8.2
7.9
6.4
5.4
9.8

Children and Their Parents3
1 Parent
2 Parent
41.4
13.1
31.3
8.9
38.9
9.5
26.8
7.9
31.6
2.8
12.5
6.6
11.3
2.1
7.3
2.2
25.1

6.6

Elders4
28.4
24.6
5.2
3.2
12.2
13.1
8.2
10.1

Childless5
11.1
7.7
12.1
9.5
9.0
7.3
9.7
7.6

Mixed6
14.9
7.0
5.9
14.2
7.5
6.3
2.4
2.1

13.1

9.3

7.5

Notes:
Poverty is measured at 50 percent median adjusted disposable income (ADPI) for individuals. Incomes are
E
adjusted by E=0.5 where ADPI=unadjusted DPI divided by household size (s) to the power E: ADPI = DPI/s .
1

2

All types of persons regardless of living situation.
Children are under age 18. They and the non-elderly adults living with them in the same household are
separated into one- and two-parent columns.
4
Adults aged 65 and over living in units with a head age 65 and over.
5
Childess are couples or singles where the reference person is under age 65.
6
Mixed households include persons living in multiple generation families.
Source: Smeeding (2003, Table 2).
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Making a Case for Policy that Supports Childbearing
Current discussions of population aging and of the prospect of a slowing or even
declining Canadian population generally emphasize two responses. The first is
“accommodationist,” looking for ways to adapt to demographic changes seen as
inevitable. The second views immigration as a partial solution. Immigration, of course,
can easily affect population size and growth. But patterns of immigration (numbers and
ages of immigrants) that would appreciably slow or reverse population aging are
impractical. Feasible patterns of immigration over the next decade or so would have little
effect on the relative number of persons over 65. While immigrants are often seen as less
“expensive” than births, these calculations can easily underestimate the costs of
assimilation, in the educational system and through meaningful employment, for the first
and second generations.
A rise in the fertility rate, by contrast, would favour both population growth and a
younger population. Yet there is little discussion of measures that might help raise the
fertility rate from current historic low levels — a total fertility rate of approximately 1.5.
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HRSDC's Knowledge Plan, 2005-2008, for example, discusses the low fertility rate at
several points, but does not discuss policies and programs that might promote higher
fertility.
There are many reasons for this lack of discussion. Some would see pronatalist policies
as threatening gains made by women in independence, freedom in choice of lifestyle, and
full participation in the labour force. Others point to the relative failure of most historical
attempts to raise birth rates by means of direct financial incentives: Europe in the 1930s,
Quebec more recently. Still others cite the modern concept of reproductive freedom;
individuals and couples should do what they wish in matters of partnering and
reproduction, without government interference: “Government has no business in the
nation's bedrooms.” There is a widespread assumption that Canadians are having very
small families because that is what they want.
But changing gender roles make it unlikely that the costs of higher fertility would fall
largely on women, and pronatalist policies are not limited to baby bonus programs. A
wide range of social and economic policies could provide a foundation for family
formation, including the birth of children, for those who wish it.
No one would argue that couples are economically motivated to have children. In purely
economic terms, children represent mostly costs with few financial returns. But economic
factors can provide powerful disincentives to childbearing, discouraging union formation
(marriage and other long-term relationships) and childbearing. The fact that the current
fertility rate is 1.5 does not necessarily mean that the average Canadian couple wants
such a small family. The observed behaviour is a product of constraints as well as
preferences, and might well be different if some major constraints were eased.
It should be noted that even modest increases in the fertility rate could yield demographic
benefits of higher natural increase (or lower natural decrease) and a slowing of the
population aging process. It would take a 40 percent increase from current levels to reach
fertility required for long-term replacement through natural increase. An increase of half
that size — adding 0.3 children to the average fertility rate — would have significant
benefits.
The suggestion here is to investigate broad social and economic policies and programs
that might provide a broader foundation for family formation by persons now
discouraged from that life choice. The aim is not higher fertility as such, for strictly
demographic reasons, but a society in which individual reproductive freedom is
maximized, not just the freedom to marry and have children, but the freedom to do so on
reasonable terms. If society were more supportive of young people especially, the fertility
rate might pretty much take care of itself.
Many social programs aim to assure older persons some basic level of independence and
dignity. But surely the independence and dignity of young adults is just as important. It
could be added that low fertility means that many older persons are being denied the deep
satisfaction that comes with grandparenthood, and an associated tighter bonding with
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their grown children. In general, extreme low fertility leads directly to a reduced number
of collateral kin, attenuating the extended family. In short, low fertility is not just a
demographic problem; it is a human problem.
Such an approach does not fit neatly into HRSDC's program description, which deals
mainly with the welfare of existing families. A different approach would deal not just
with the welfare of families already in existence, but with potential families — those that
might have existed or might yet exist in a different social and economic climate.
Moreover, with the partial exception of lone parents, those targeted do not fall into any of
HRSDC's named target groups: children, seniors, persons with work-related disabilities,
recent immigrants, Aboriginal people or the unattached 45 to 64 (most of whom will be
beyond the prime reproductive years). The target group is the average Canadian young
adult. These are people who are not disadvantaged in general, but may be disadvantaged
with respect to family formation in a socio-economic environment less than congenial to
family formation.
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6. Needed Family Research: Themes, Priorities and Research
Styles
Life is a process, both the life of the individual and the life of the family or household.
An individual’s life can last upward of a hundred years — over 52 million minutes — in
each of which a person chooses, acts and reacts. The Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk
(2004, pp. 375-376), in his novel, Snow, compares human life to a snowflake, each one
distinct, with a limited lifetime from formation to disappearance, its form “determined by
the temperature, the direction and force of the wind, the altitude of the cloud, and any
number of mysterious forces.” But a human life is more complicated than that of a
snowflake.
Families and households intertwine many individual lives and are thus more complicated
still. It is even difficult to say when a family or household begins and when it ends,
unlike human lives.
It is no wonder that there is much we do not know about the Canadian family. But, as the
body of this report shows, progress has been made.
Life-course analysis, as described above, has been a major step forward. It yields but a
skeletal view of the lives of individuals and families. But that view at least focusses on
crucial events or transitions, events that mark major changes in status for the individual,
and that have major consequences into an indefinite future. The choices underlying these
events have been termed “fateful choices.” The movie that one chose to see last weekend,
or the colour of shirt one chooses to wear on a given day typically have few if any lasting
consequences. To marry or not to marry, to have a child or not, to divorce or not, to finish
secondary school or not — these decisions and turning points in one’s life have
consequences for a whole lifetime.
The main outlines of the individual life course and the family/household life cycle in
Canada have been well documented, thanks mainly to census and sample survey data
provided by Statistics Canada. Beginning in the 1980s, Statistics Canada conducted
several cross-sectional sample surveys (involving a sample of respondents contacted once
in a given year) pertaining to family and the life course. Many of these provide temporal
depth through the addition of retrospective questions about past behaviour. The focus on
these questions, of course, is on information that can be reliably recalled at a later time,
for example, age at school leaving, age at first full-time work, marital history, number of
children born and so forth. In the nature of the case, it is difficult or not impossible to
gather survey information on such things as attitudes and expectations in the distant past,
or even factual information relating to less important life experiences, for example, exact
dates of casual employment, such as summer jobs in youth.
More recently, Statistics Canada has launched longitudinal or panel studies, in which a
sample of respondents is interviewed several times (in waves) over a period of several
months or years. These are thought to provide more accurate information on the specific
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transitions referred to above. But most important, they enable researchers to investigate
how current attitudes and expectations affect future behaviour as measured in a later
round of the survey, thus getting closer to a causal understanding of how and to what
extent subjective factors affect behaviour. By the same token, they provide for a closer
look at the consequences of earlier behaviours, and their effects on current attitudes and
expectations and on present behaviours.
Despite the wealth of new information provided by these sources, there is much more to
learn. Existing data might be compared to descriptions of the tip of an iceberg. To begin
with, more events or transitions need to be added to the life-course descriptions
highlighted in Chapter 4, for example migration and other changes of residence, on which
data already exist, or marital infidelity as a factor in divorce, for which we have very little
data – understandably so, given the official governmental status of most social surveys in
Canada. It is unlikely that Statistics Canada could or would routinely ask Canadians such
questions as “Have you ever committed adultery?” Yet extramarital affairs often are an
important factor in the divorce process.
Beyond more descriptive data on events and transitions, there is a need to drill down to
deeper levels of the processes and mechanisms involved in the myriad decisions we make
over our lives. What are the goals, emotions, thought processes, expectations, social
pressures that drive us? To what extent do we really choose our life paths, and to what
extent are we programmed — by family, peers, churches, government, popular culture
and the media? To what extent are our choices severely limited by poverty, dysfunctional
families or the labour market?
Answers to these and other questions will require empirical research that will supplement
and complement the sample survey research discussed above, but also the development
of theories and models that can, if only provisionally, explicate underlying processes and
mechanisms not easily captured in empirical data or statistical models.
What follows is a list — of necessity partial and selective — of what we see as important
family research priorities, both as to substance and style of research.
Substantive Themes
Topics on which more research is needed include the following, numbered for easy
reference.
1. What is “the family”? What does this term mean to Canadians? This is not so much a
matter of seeking hard definitions, which in any case are changing and somewhat
arbitrary, as it is of trying to map the mental landscape of Canadians in the face of
changes wrought by the second demographic transition, and in a time of ever
increasing cultural diversity in Canada. Especially important is the role of kin outside
the immediate nuclear-family household of spouses/partners and children.
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2. How is the “family household” (a group of related persons living in the same house or
apartment) positioned in the broader kin network? What are the expectations,
interactions and sentiments among members? What are the transfers among kin in
terms of money or other forms of help? How do these compare to expectations,
interactions, sentiments and transfers within the family household? That is, the
household structure needs to be separated from the sense of obligation people have to
each other and the effective transfers that occur. What about the many Canadians who
live alone, that is, in a house or apartment by themselves, or the many Canadians who
have no kin or only a few, or whose kin live at a great distance? Statistics Canada’s
General Social Surveys have provided data on these issues, but they are far from
complete.
3. What are the determinants of the various life-course transitions? Even more, how do
these determinants fit together in the complex process by which people finish high
school or not, marry or not, have children or not, succeed or not at work — to
mention only a few of the key transitions? We know many of the correlates of these
events, but not the underlying mechanisms. In addition, we need to study not only the
transitions but family life across the life course. Do complex transitions make
families stronger or weaker, and why? How and why do these transitions differ
between women and men? Is it true that men have lost interest in children and
commitment?
4. What do Canadians want of the family? What do they expect? How realistic are their
expectations? How are their expectations shaped by popular culture and the mass
media? How are they shaped, and perhaps limited, by economic, legal and social
institutions? Do Canadians of different ages and genders get what they want, or are
they often disappointed? Answers to these kinds of questions will require research
designs that involve interviewing at greater depth than is possible in large, telephoneinterview surveys.
5. With whom do people have earning and caring links, and how does the sharing of
earning and caring occur? How do Canadians perceive real or imagined conflicts
between paid work and family life, and between paid and unpaid work within and
beyond the family household, but also, between adult siblings in different households
in regard to care of aging parents? What are the real and imagined conflicts in the
division of household responsibilities between spouses or partners? To what extent
are women in particular disadvantaged by these conflicts? How do Canadians try to
cope with these conflicts? What are the negative consequences for adults and
children?
6. Despite the much-touted “loss of functions,” the contemporary family still plays a
central role in the early rearing of children. And so children are particularly
vulnerable to family malfunction. What are the most serious problems affecting
children, and how do they arise? What can be done to protect children, by the parents,
by day cares and schools, by social agencies, by employers? The “standard” model of
an effective family assumes the presence of two adults. What are the special
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vulnerabilities of children in lone-parent families? Under what conditions do these
children thrive? What are the special problems facing step-families? What about
children in families headed by non-married couples, where legal rights and
responsibilities can be hazy?
7. How do children fare in the case of separation and divorce, now affecting a large
minority of Canadian marriages? How do the partners fare? To what extent have
modern laws and practices dealt with the special disabilities faced by women in
divorce? What are the causes of Canada’s relatively high divorce rate? Can anything
be done about it?
8. How do family dynamics affect the home leaving of young adults? Of special concern
is premature home leaving, often associated with family conflict, dropping out of
school and marginal employment. How do parents facilitate or complicate a
successful launch into independent living? How do young people cope with the
lowered levels of living typically associated with leaving the parental home? What
are the respective roles of cohabitation and formal marriage in achieving full adult
status?
9. What role does the family play in furthering or hampering the education of youth and
their successful integration into the labour force?
10. Why do young people marry? What specifically are they seeking that they cannot find
in cohabitation or the single life?
11. Do young Canadians want children; how many? To what extent are current low
fertility rates the result of their values, goals and attitudes, and to what extent are they
the result of difficult economic circumstances (especially labour and housing
markets) with special impact on the early stages of family formation?
12. As the Canadian population ages — especially as the baby boomers age — what is
the emerging family role of the elderly in family life? What proportion of older
persons are physically and financially able to provide support to the younger
generation, in securing adequate housing, caring for grandchildren, etc.? Do the
elderly indirectly harm the younger generations, as some have argued, by voting their
own interests in the matter of government programs for the elderly, while giving less
support to education, day care and the like? Do older people without children or
grandchildren think and act differently? How do families over generations accumulate
advantages for themselves?
13. How do families cope with the eventual decline and death of elderly relatives? What
is the decision-making process in the transition of the elderly from their long-term
residences to condos, apartments, assisted-living units and to full-care institutions?
How are the transitions of elderly persons linked to health questions and to
connections with family? Do families discuss these issues and plan for the future?
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14. How do families act in a mediating capacity in relation to the institutions of society?
To what extent are second demographic transition families less able to be effective
agents of social integration? Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002) proposed that the first
demographic transition increased social cohesion, but the second transition reduced
cohesion. How do families mediate between individuals and other networks?
15. How does the diversity of families need to be described, in terms of family form,
heritage, socio-economic status, location/distance, division of labour, disability, etc.
How do macro-economic changes, such as increases in non-standard work, influence
the possibilities of caring?
16. What is the role of government in setting the right conditions for families to exist?
How could it support families that are so different in such matters as age at first birth,
number of children and available resources? More generally, how does one help
vulnerable families, especially those who have disabilities or difficulties in terms of
earning and caring?
Research Styles
A well-rounded knowledge of the contemporary Canadian family, of the forces shaping it
and of its effects on individuals, the community and society, will require a multi-pronged
approach. No one discipline and no one research strategy can do the job alone.
Much of the knowledge reviewed in this report derives from the application of one
powerful research style, characterized by the statistical analysis of census and large-scale
sample survey data. Arguably, this has become the dominant research approach in
contemporary North American social science. Its dominance reflects its scientific power.
But survey research is not without its limitations, and other approaches with other
emphases are needed for a broader, deeper and more useful knowledge of family life. A
few key ones are highlighted below.
Multidisciplinary Approaches
A challenge in drawing up a framework is how to incorporate the varied disciplinary
approaches to the study of families. As can be seen in the above discussion, economists
have dealt with explaining determinants of marriage, and sociologists have delved into
family values and norms, gender differences within families, and the various ways by
which families inter-play with social class, culture, communities, neighbourhood and
networks. A cursory glance at some of the studies on families shows that social
psychologists examine consequences of family functioning and family structures on the
development of children, and epidemiologists and health scientists investigate families as
determinants of physical and mental health of both adults and children. Social
anthropologists and historians study families of the past to help understand present day
families. Legal research looks into implications of changing families including rights of
cohabiting couples, gay families and custody over children; and political scientists
examine how family members function as citizens, their participation in community life
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and the changing role of the state vis-à-vis the change in roles of families in the welfare
of individuals.
A framework that encompasses interdisciplinary approaches to study families is the
“transaction concept” proposed by Suzanne Peters (1996) as a basis for the study of
family social and economic dynamics. The framework is comprehensive in that it covers
a wide range of transactions that transpire within families (categorized into domains) and
the various conditions (at different dimension levels) that shape the transactions. Peters
did a comprehensive review of previous family studies and how they fit into the
framework, and made recommendations in terms of developing the concepts and
measures of transactions. Though more recent research on families have not fully utilized
the potentials of the transaction approach, several studies on families could well fit into
the transaction framework, for example, studies on time use and on social and community
support. Furthermore, the transaction approach can fit into the more general framework
that we propose. For instance, one of the areas of research that we include inter- and
intra-generation transfers can make use of the transactions defined by Peters (1996, p.7)
as “social interactions through which resources are transferred from one person(s) to
other(s) to meet needs.”
Data and Methods
Considerations of data and methods are essential to the development of a framework.
Quantitative data, such as those gathered through censuses, vital statistics, administrative
records and surveys both cross-sectional and longitudinal would continue to be useful in
family research. Linking of data from various sources has enriched the databases of
studies on families, permitting analysis at the level of individuals, families and
communities. Thus, merging information aggregated from the census data to records of
individuals gathered through surveys has allowed the investigation of the effects of the
environment on individuals. However, analytical challenges remain. While conceptual
underpinning calls for examination of the effects of say, neighbourhood or communities,
census data could be aggregated mainly on the basis of geographic configurations that do
not necessarily coincide with these socially defined groups.
Linking quantitative and qualitative data have also been recognized as possibly the best
means of understanding transactions that transpire within families, yet no such linking on
a national level has as yet been done.
Advances in computing facilities and in techniques of quantitative and qualitative
analysis, ranging from descriptive to multivariate and multi-level analysis, have also
benefited family research. Given the aim of family research of informing policies,
techniques that would link results of micro-level analysis on individuals and families to
macro-level generalization would be of great interest. Micro-simulations such as those
developed by Statistics Canada, namely, LifePaths and Social Policy Simulation
Database and Model (SPSD/M), seem to be one such useful technique. This microsimulation approach could be used to study transfers within family households and in kin
networks that go beyond the household.
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Styles of Social Research and the Design of Effective Interventions
Presumably the research mandate of HRSDC is one of policy and applied research, that
is, research geared toward practical ends.2 Although clearly valuable, much current social
science research falls short in serving these ends. A central problem is the absence of
well-developed models of process and of mechanisms. In particular, statistical models of
social survey data do a good job at description, including the description of relationships
among variables. They tell us how measured inputs are related to measured outputs. But
typically they say little about the often complex processes that connect the two. Process
and mechanisms remain in a “black box.”3
Stated differently, many statistical models can describe and predict, but they cannot
explain in any deeper sense than accounting for variance in a dependent variable. The
political scientist Eugene Meehan pointed out many years ago (1968) that models
yielding predictions enable humans to adjust to changes that are foreseen, but they do not
provide guidance for possible interventions to forestall the changes. For that, one needs
explanatory models and to know not just that something is likely to happen, but why it is
likely to happen. A similar point has been made more recently by an economist (Olsen
1988) who points out correctly that if we don’t know why some relationship or trend
exists, we don’t know whether it will continue to exist in the future. The need for greater
attention to process and mechanisms has recently been treated at length by Hedström and
Swedberg (1998).
Effective research on mechanisms will differ from standard social survey research in two
important ways.
1. It will deal with smaller, but still broadly representative samples, such that intensive
interviewing is possible and practical. The costs of nationally representative
probability samples of tens of thousands of respondents has led to a reliance on
telephone interviews using random digit dialing, and interviews that are necessarily
short (typically less than an hour). Questions are largely closed-ended, and time and
medium do not favour extensive probing. More and different information can be
obtained in a personal interview by a skilled interviewer.
For example, the orientation of young Canadians toward family formation could
better be elicited by more intensive interviews — their values, attitudes, hopes and
fears, and the role of other people and institutions. Research on fertility values by
Beaujot (2000, pp. 108-110, 248-250) is an example of the kind of fieldwork that is
needed.
2. Since mechanisms and processes underlying family formation may involve variables
that are not easily measured, even in intensive interviews, effective research must rely
on systematic theory construction and theoretical (as contrasted with statistical)
modelling. This is particularly so because the processes involved are dynamic, with
strong non-linearities and feedback. A temporal single-equation linear statistical
model cannot represent important features of process. Yet an understanding of
process is crucial to the design of effective interventions.
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Computers have fostered the growth of new techniques for theoretical modelling (or
simulation). One promising and underutilized approach in social science is that of
dynamic systems modelling, with such user-friendly software as Vensim, Goldsim,
Modelmaker, etc. (For an early discussion of such models in sociology, see Hanneman,
1988). The dynamics systems approach could be particularly effective in mapping the
complex interrelations among programs and policies in the public and private sectors, and
among government programs at various levels. It also lends itself to the study of the lifecourse dynamics of individuals, including goal-setting and goal modification based on
previous experience.
As noted above, another promising approach is micro-simulation, especially newer, more
behavioural forms, such as agent-based or rule-based modelling. An exploration of this
new modelling tool, with specific application to demography (including marriage) is by
Billari and Prskawetz (2003).
Model-based studies of medium-size samples, as suggested above, would serve to
complement current large-scale sample surveys on the one hand, and traditional
qualitative policy research on the other.
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Endnotes
1

For a brief summary of some of the most important differences, see Burch (1980).

2

A useful distinction was made some years ago by the American sociologist Amitai
Etzioni. Roughly, policy research investigates and makes recommendations regarding
goals, while applied research is concerned solely with means to reach previously
established goals. In the present context, useful policy research could be done on the
meaning of “individual and family well-being,” and how the two are related. HRSDC’s
promotion of a social indicators program would be a major step forward. In the absence
of such indicators, narrow concepts of well-being based on national income-accounting
tend to predominate.
3

A partial exception is research using structural equations models (e.g., path analysis),
which aim to elucidate causal processes over time. But these still use only readily
measured variables, with any other, possibly important, variables relegated to an error
term. In any case, many of the most popular multivariate techniques are essentially
single-equation models (e.g., Cox regression).
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